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ABSTRACT 
 
Malawi has, in the last few decades, undergone several reforms relating to monetary, 
exchange rate and financial integration policies in a bid to achieve sustainable economic 
growth. Despite these reforms, however, the country has barely attained desirable 
macroeconomic performance. This study sets out to establish if the need for these policy 
reforms is due to the fact that the country is constrained from the simultaneous achievement 
of optimal levels of monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial 
integration, as postulated by the ‘trilemma’. The trilemma is evaluated using an approach 
introduced by Aizenman et al. (2008), in which the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method is 
applied to a model in which a constant is regressed on indices constructed for the policy 
intermediate goals; the results indicate that the trilemma is a binding constraint in Malawi and 
that the largest trade-off is between exchange rate stability and financial integration. 
Given these constraints, the study also considers the combination of the trilemma intermediate 
policy goals that has been dominant in the country in the last three decades, using predicted 
values from the model and a graphical analysis to explore this objective. The analysis reveals 
that Malawi has, on average, prioritised exchange rate stability and monetary policy 
independence at the expense of financial integration. 
The study also assesses how the trilemma intermediate policy goals affect macroeconomic 
performance, specifically regarding output growth rate and inflation. The results reveal that 
exchange rate stability is associated with faster output growth, financial integration is 
associated with higher inflation, and that monetary policy independence is not a significant 
factor. The results emphasise the importance of consistent stability of the exchange rate if 
Malawi is to achieve faster and sustainable economic growth. Given this, policy makers must 
be cautious, as the current floating exchange rate regime, combined with financial integration, 
could lead to slow growth and high inflation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In pursuit of the macroeconomic stability that creates an environment conducive to 
sustainable economic growth, countries adopt different macroeconomic policies. One of the 
biggest challenges for most countries, however, is how to simultaneously manage the three 
intermediate1 goals of macroeconomic policy that would contribute to attaining this; monetary 
policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration. Aizenman (2010), 
defines national monetary policy independence (or sovereignty) as the ability of a country to 
implement its own monetary policy in order to achieve specific objectives without being 
constrained to follow the monetary policy actions of another country or a monetary union. 
The highest level of exchange rate stability would be when a country pegs the value of its 
currency to that of another (Mandilaras, 2014). Financial integration (or free capital mobility), 
as defined by Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015), describes a situation in which the financial 
markets of neighbouring, regional or global economies are closely linked. Ogbuagu & 
Ewubare (2015) indicate that this integration can take various forms, one of which is 
elimination of controls on cross-border financial operations and flows. 
The trilemma of International Finance and Macroeconomics, also known as the ‘impossible 
trinity’, postulates that it is not possible for a country to achieve optimal levels of all the three 
intermediate policy goals simultaneously (Mandilaras, 2014; Obstfeld et al., 2005). The 
argument posed in the literature (Aizenman et al., 2008; Hutchison et al., 2012; Obstfeld et 
al., 2005; Sengupta, 2015) is that there are trade-offs between them; an improvement in one 
has a negative effect on one or both of the other two. Even though attainment of the three 
intermediate policy goals is desirable for the attainment of ultimate policy goals such as high 
economic growth and low inflation, countries are thus faced by the constraint of having to 
choose at most two at a particular point in time. The hypothesis is based on the theory of 
uncovered interest rate parity2 and empirical evidence. 
In light of the trilemma, over the past few decades countries have tried out different 
combinations of the three. For instance, Aizenman (2010) and Hsing (2012a) observed that 
                                                          
1 The three goals: monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration, are 
intermediate goals of macroeconomic policy since they are used to attain ultimate goals such as higher economic 
growth and low inflation. 
2 ‘Uncovered interest rate parity’, as defined by Bekaert et al. (2007), Cumby and Obstfeld (1982) and Francis et 
al. (2002), refers to a parity condition in which the difference between the interest rates in the two countries is 
equal to the expected rate of change in the exchange rate. 
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the United States of America (USA) has embraced financial integration, where anyone is free 
to invest in and out of USA with ease; the country’s central bank has autonomy over 
monetary policy, but exchange rates are determined by market forces.  Countries in the 
Eurozone like France, Germany, Italy and Greece have also embraced free capital mobility 
but, as Hsing (2012a) notes, they have eliminated any exchange rate movements within the 
Eurozone by adopting the Euro as their currency; this in turn means that the freedom to 
conduct independent monetary policy has been lost. Lastly, Hsing (2012a; 2012b) indicated 
that, while China has autonomy over its monetary policy and controls its exchange rate 
through maintaining strict exchange controls, financial liberalization is sacrificed. This 
diversity in policy choices among countries would seem to indicate that country choices 
depend on their unique needs and circumstances. 
Malawi, like many other countries, could be battling with the trilemma; this has become 
especially pronounced in the last few decades as the country aims to achieve exchange rate 
and price stability while opening up to the global financial system. According to Chipeta & 
Mkandawire (1991) and Mwabutwa (2014), after independence in 1964 the country’s 
financial system was heavily controlled by government; there were onerous exchange controls 
and direct controls on credit and interest rates, in addition to the government adopting a fixed 
exchange rate system. Mangani (2011) and Ngalawa & Viegi (2011) noted that financial 
liberalisation started in late 1980s as a result of macroeconomic imbalances developing due to 
the failure of the economy to adjust to external shocks. Some of the reforms mentioned by 
Ngalawa & Viegi (2011) include floating exchange rates, changing from direct to indirect 
tools of monetary policy, and relaxing some exchange controls to open up the current and 
capital accounts. 
Despite the reforms adopted, by 1994 the exchange rate, inflation and output had become 
more volatile, leading to further reforms being adopted between 1994 and 2014, some of 
which were mentioned in Mangani (2011) and Simwaka & Mkandawire (2011). The most 
recent reforms were implemented in 2012 when the country shifted from a peg to the US$ to a 
floating exchange rate regime (Lungu, 2015; Simwaka & Mkandawire, 2011). Additional 
exchange controls were loosened during this period to further open up the current account, 
and liberalisation of the capital account is gradually progressing. Additionally, as stated in the 
Reserve Bank of Malawi Monetary Policy Statement Number 3 (2016, January 06), the 
Reserve Bank started to use an interest rate targeting monetary policy framework (using the 
Taylor rule equations) in the context of inflation targeting in January 2014, moving away 
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from the previous regime of targeting monetary aggregates. Even after these policy changes, 
however, the problem with volatility of the exchange rate, inflation rate and output persists. 
These frequent changes in macroeconomic policies, and the observed volatility in 
macroeconomic indicators in Malawi, could be explained by the trilemma; that is, the 
constraints policy makers face between monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability 
and financial integration.  
Empirical studies on the trilemma concept have been plagued by the difficulty in measuring a 
country’s level of achievement for each of the intermediate policy goals which Aizenman et 
al. (2008) addressed by developing indices for the goals. Studies focusing on various issues 
relating to the trilemma have since emerged in literature. Most empirical studies are, however, 
concentrated in developed countries (especially in Europe) and in emerging3 market 
developing countries. The few studies that were done in non-emerging4 market developing 
countries, such as those by Aizenman (2010), Aizenman & Ito (2011) and Aizenman et al. 
(2008; 2010; 2013), mostly assessed the trilemma concept at an aggregate level, and not at a 
single country level. A single country study (Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015)) was done in 
Nigeria but focused on only two of the three, namely exchange rate stability and financial 
integration; there seems to be a gap in the literature regarding single country studies in non-
emerging market developing countries. 
Under normal circumstances, each of the intermediate policy goals of the trilemma should 
promote lower and stable inflation and higher and sustainable output growth (Aizenman & 
Ito, 2011; Hsing, 2012b; 2013b; Mandilaras, 2014; Obstfeld, 1994). Empirical studies on the 
issue have, however, produced mixed results. For instance, using multiple countries, 
Aizenman (2010) found that greater monetary policy independence is associated with higher 
inflation and greater capital account openness with lower inflation in developing countries. 
Contrary to these results, Hutchison et al. (2012) found that, in India, greater monetary 
independence was associated with lower inflation, and greater capital account openness with 
higher inflation volatility. Hutchison et al. (2012) found greater exchange rate stability to be 
associated with lower inflation volatility in India, but Hsing (2012b) found that in Greece 
                                                          
3 Emerging markets refer to national economies that are still considered developing but are progressing towards 
becoming advanced. They are often characterised by high prospects of economic growth but lower per capita 
income and less developed capital markets than advanced economies. Examples according to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) are Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Indonesia and Mexico. 
4 Non-emerging market developing countries are poor unindustrialised economies characterised with low per 
capita income and underdeveloped capital markets. Malawi is in this category according to the IMF 
classification. 
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greater exchange rate stability had no significant effect on either the level of, or the volatility 
in, inflation.  
These mixed results would seem to indicate that country choices and the effects of the 
trilemma on inflation and output depend on country-specific factors, and is thus pertinent for 
Malawi. The study could provide some assistance in understanding the effects of 
macroeconomic policy changes that the country has gone through in the last three decades, 
particularly whether and how changes in the intermediate policy goals can be linked to 
inflation and output performance.  
Given the background, the study is aimed at achieving the following goals: 
1. To empirically evaluate the trade-offs between monetary policy independence, 
exchange rate stability and financial integration in Malawi as implied by the trilemma 
hypothesis;  
2. To determine the combination of the intermediate policy goals of the trilemma that has 
been dominant or prevalent in Malawi in the last three decades; 
3. To assess the extent to which pursuing the trilemma intermediate policy goals has 
affected macroeconomic performance in Malawi in terms of the level and volatility of 
inflation and output growth over the last three decades.  
 
The study adopts a positivist, quantitative approach, using OLS and Eviews software for 
analysis. Specifically, the study follows an existing methodology in the literature introduced 
by Aizenman et al. (2008) and later used by Aizenman et al. (2009; 2010; 2011; 2012), Hsing 
(2012a; 2012b; 2013a; 2013b), Hutchison et al. (2012) and Jian et al. (2011), among others. 
The use of an existing methodology could make the findings comparable to those of other 
studies that applied the same methodology to other countries.  
Firstly, indices are constructed for each of the three intermediate policy goals using formulae 
developed by Aizenman et al. (2008) for monetary policy independence and exchange rate 
stability, and by Jian et al. (2011) for the financial integration index. The monetary policy 
independence index is constructed by normalizing correlations between Malawian and South 
African interest rates. The exchange rate stability index is constructed by normalizing 
volatility (the standard deviation) of the exchange rate between the Malawi Kwacha and the 
US$ and the financial integration index as the ratio of the sum of the gross stock of foreign 
assets and liabilities to gross domestic product (GDP). These indices measure Malawi’s level 
of achievement in each of the intermediate policy goals over a period.  
5 
 
Secondly, to evaluate the tradeoffs between the intermediate policy goals and hence assess 
whether or not the trilemma hypothesis is binding in Malawi, a linear model is estimated 
using the OLS method by regressing a constant (one) on the three constructed indices. The 
rationale for estimating this linear model, as argued by Hutchison et al. (2012:11), is that if 
there are indeed trade-offs between the three intermediate policy goals, their weighted sum 
should equal unity, reflecting the overall constraint on the three indices. The parameters in 
this model provide approximate estimates of the weights assigned to each intermediate policy 
goal.  
Next, to determine the most prevalent combination of the intermediate policy goals of the 
trilemma over the sample period, a graphical analysis of possible combinations is conducted. 
Lastly, to assess the effects of the trilemma intermediate policy goals on macroeconomic 
performance, the OLS method is applied on three models in which the macroeconomic 
performance indicators - the output growth rate, the inflation rate and inflation volatility5 - are 
regressed on the indices for the intermediate policy goals of the trilemma and some control 
variables. 
The study uses monthly data spanning the period from January 1983 to December 2015 
obtained from the Reserve Bank of Malawi, Malawi National Statistics Office, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
websites.  
The thesis is organised into six chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction where a brief 
background and context to the study is provided while stating the motivation, significance, 
goals and methodology of the study. Chapter 2 provides a review of existing theoretical and 
empirical literature on the trilemma concept which should provide an understanding of the 
subject and gaps that the study may fill. Chapter 3 follows with a description of the context of 
the study, providing an overview of Malawi’s financial system, how the three policies 
(monetary policy, exchange rate policy and financial liberalisation) have been pursued in the 
country and how the economy has performed over the study period.  Chapter 4 describes the 
methodology, procedures, techniques and data to be used. Chapter 5 follows with a 
presentation, interpretation and discussion of the results. Chapter 6 concludes, providing a 
summary of the research and findings, policy recommendations and areas for further research. 
  
                                                          
5 Measured by standard deviation of the inflation rate (Consumer Price Index) 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter provides a review of existing literature relating to the trilemma concept. It is 
aimed at providing an outline of the trilemma hypothesis while highlighting the position in the 
body of relevant knowledge in which the study is located. It is divided into two main sections: 
theoretical and empirical literature. 
The theoretical review describes in detail the nature of the trilemma hypothesis. It includes 
definitions of the three components of the trilemma and provides theoretical explanations 
regarding why they may or may not be desirable. It also explains why the intermediate policy 
goals of the trilemma cannot be pursued simultaneously, in the process highlighting theories 
from which the trilemma hypothesis draws its arguments. Lastly, it reviews theoretical 
debates on the validity of the trilemma and theoretical aspects regarding how each of the three 
intermediate policy goals affects the macro-economy. 
The empirical section discusses studies that have been done on the trilemma. Focus is on 
studies that have empirically examined the validity of the trilemma, those that have assessed 
the evolution of the trilemma intermediate policy goals over time and those that have 
examined their effects on economic performance. 
2.1 The Trilemma or Impossible Trinity Hypothesis  
As previously stated, the ‘trilemma’, also called the ‘impossible trinity’, is a hypothesis in the 
field of International Finance and Macroeconomics which posits that a country cannot 
simultaneously pursue optimal levels of the following three intermediate goals of 
macroeconomic policy: monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial 
integration (Aizenman et al., 2008; 2009; 2010; Globan, 2014; Grenville, 2011; Hosny et al., 
2015; Mandilaras, 2014). This, according to Aizenman & Ito (2011), Hutchison et al. (2012) 
and Sengupta (2015), is due to the fact that there are trade-offs between the three, such that an 
improvement in one induces a worsening in one or both of the remaining two. Consequently, 
Jian et al. (2011), Mandilaras (2014), Mankiw (2010) and Schoenmaker (2011), argue that a 
country can pursue only one or at most two of the trilemma intermediate policy goals at a 
point in time, but not all three. 
To illustrate, the trilemma is often described using some version of the triangle in Figure 2.1 
overleaf:  
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(See Aizenman, 2010; Aizenman & Ito, 2011; Aizenman et al., 2009)  
The sides of the triangle each represent one of the trilemma intermediate policy goals: 
monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration. All three are 
desirable for the attainment of ultimate goals of macroeconomic policy such as high economic 
growth and low inflation but, according to the trilemma, a country can be on two at most at 
any one time.  
The vertices of the triangle thus represent possible combinations a country can choose. A 
country that chooses the top vertex values the freedom of setting its own interest rates 
(monetary policy independence) and stable (pegged) exchange rates but forgoes the benefits 
of free capital mobility by employing capital controls; China would be a good example. The 
left vertex represents a situation where a country that chooses monetary policy independence 
and free capital mobility has to let exchange rates float; the United States opted for this 
option. Lastly, a country that chooses the right vertex accrues the benefits from free capital 
mobility and stable exchange rates but at the expense of its freedom to conduct independent 
monetary policy; a preferred choice of countries in the Eurozone. 
The next section examines the benefits and costs that may be associated with use of the 
various intermediate policy goals. 
 
Exchange Rate 
Stability 
Monetary Policy 
Independence 
Financial Integration 
Free capital mobility and stable 
exchange rates but no monetary 
policy independence. Example: 
Eurozone countries 
Independent monetary 
policy and free capital 
mobility but flexible 
exchange rates. Example: 
United States 
Independent monetary policy and 
stable exchange rates but capital 
controls. Example: China 
Figure 2.1: The Trilemma Triangle 
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2.1.1 Use of the Trilemma Intermediate Policy Goals (Advantages and Disadvantages) 
Theoretical literature provides several reasons as to why the trilemma intermediate policy 
goals may be appealing to policy makers. Each, however, may be associated with undesirable 
effects. The trilemma, accordingly, emanates from the difficulty in determining which 
intermediate policy goal is more beneficial than the others in promoting macroeconomic 
stability. 
Monetary Policy Independence 
To begin with, Mankiw (2010) argues that monetary policy independence affords a central 
bank the ability to use monetary policy as a tool for stabilising the economy. With monetary 
policy autonomy, a central bank is able to stimulate a sluggish economy by engaging in 
monetary easing or cool down an overheated economy by engaging in monetary tightening 
(Hsing, 2012; 2013).  Additionally, Mandilaras (2014) points out that, without being 
subjected to other countries’ macroeconomic management policies or actions, a central bank 
can effectively respond to external shocks with monetary sovereignty. Monetary 
independence thus enables a central bank to use its own monetary policy as a tool to achieve 
internal balance which can potentially lead to a stable and sustainable economic growth. 
 
On the flip side, as argued by Aizenman & Ito (2011), greater monetary policy independence 
can lead to increased inflation and output volatility if policy makers, faced with price and 
wage rigidities, use their sovereignty to manipulate inflation and output movements in the 
short run. Aizenman & Ito (2011) further argue that, without fiscal discipline, policy makers 
can abuse their sovereignty by monetising the national debt which can breed volatility, 
especially high and unstable inflation. This mostly happens in countries where the central 
bank is not fully independent from government or political influence. 
Exchange Rate Stability 
Hsing (2013) argues that exchange rate stability (fixed / pegged exchange rates) is attractive 
to policy makers mainly because it protects the value of a country’s currency. Floating 
exchange rates, on the other hand, are prone to speculative dynamics which, according to 
Mankiw (2010) and Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015), may result in excessive volatility in 
exchange rates and in turn broader economic instability, especially in small open economies 
with inefficient foreign exchange markets. As such, stable exchange rates allow individuals 
and institutions or businesses to make concrete long-term plans and participate in the world 
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economy without reference to possible adverse exchange rate movements.  Moreover, as 
Aizenman & Ito (2011) and Mandilaras (2014) indicate, stable exchange rates may lead to 
price stability by (i) providing an anchor for inflationary expectations and (ii) by mitigating 
uncertainty which lowers the risk premium, in turn fostering domestic and international 
investment and trade. Further, Aizenman & Glick (2009) argue that maintaining exchange 
rate stability during an economic crisis can increase confidence in the central bank and 
thereby expedite the effectiveness of efforts aimed at stabilising output movements.  
 
On the other hand, high levels of exchange rate stability, according to Aizenman & Ito (2011), 
can limit policy makers by removing the option to use the exchange rate as a potentially 
effective policy tool for absorbing external shocks. A free floating exchange rate, in 
comparison, acts as a natural defence against unfavourable international capital flows 
(Globan, 2014). For instance, during excessive capital inflows, the exchange rate would 
appreciate, leading to an increase in the foreign price of domestic assets, automatically 
reducing demand for the domestic assets by foreign investors. 
 
A pegged exchange rate may be desirable as a policy tool for stabilising the economy through 
stabilising the exchange rate and prices, but may also be a source of volatility, especially 
during excessive foreign capital flows. 
Financial Integration 
There is a heated debate regarding whether or not financial integration is beneficial. For some 
proponents (Aizenman & Ito, 2011; Hsing, 2012; Mandilaras, 2014) a financially open 
economy attracts foreign capital inflows in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
portfolio investment and other forms of investment. The increase in investment boosts output 
in the short-run by enhancing or supplementing domestic savings and hence promotes fixed 
investment and economic growth (Aizenman & Ito, 2011; Hsing, 2012; Mandilaras, 2014). 
Additionally, Aizenman & Ito (2011) and Mankiw (2010) argue that financial integration 
encourages foreigners to bring their expertise (technological and managerial know-how) into 
the country, increasing domestic factor productivity and in turn boosting output.  
 
Financial integration also enables a country’s citizens to invest in international financial 
markets and thereby diversify their portfolios. Aizenman & Ito (2011), Mandilaras (2014) and 
Obstfeld (1994) argue that this international diversification may help a country stabilise 
through risk sharing with other countries and may also encourage efficient allocation of 
capital as well as production specialisation in the long run. Capital-poor countries, according 
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to Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015), can especially benefit from financial integration as they can 
diversify away their production bases which are mostly agriculture and natural resource-
based. This is why Levine (2001) asserts that if having a broader base of capital is one of the 
drivers of economic growth, then financial integration may be part of the solution.  
 
Mandilaras (2014) and Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015) further posit that financial integration can 
generate long-run indirect benefits from better and more appropriate economic policies; the 
argument is that the cost of policy mistakes increases with greater financial integration. Policy 
makers would then take extra caution when formulating or implementing policies, bearing in 
mind that any mistake would reduce their country’s competitiveness on the international 
market.  
 
Financial integration is, however, not without flaws. Perhaps the most well-known side effect 
of greater financial integration is that it increases the risk exposure of countries to volatile 
short-term cross-border capital flows (hot money) which are subject to sudden stops and 
reversals (Aizenman et al., 2009; Aizenman & Ito, 2011). Volatile cross-border flows are one 
of the major causes of economic instability at both country and global level. Most economic 
or financial crises in the last few decades were either caused, or exacerbated, by the 
interconnectedness of world financial markets. For instance, the 2008 global financial crisis 
started in the United States but spread across the globe due to the integrated nature of the US 
and international financial markets.  
 
Further, as mentioned by Sengupta (2015), large capital inflows can fuel domestic inflationary 
pressures and the formation of asset price bubbles which have the potential to cause economic 
instability. This is due to the fact that capital inflows dramatically increase the demand for 
domestic assets and hence demand for the local currency and eventually the monetary base. 
 
Further, Buigut & Rao (2011) and Jian et al. (2011) argue that greater financial integration 
can reduce national government autonomy in macroeconomic policy management. This is 
because policy makers may be obliged to follow international standards to compete on the 
international market. 
 
Lastly, developing countries are prone to capital flight problems when they choose greater 
financial liberalisation. Most developing countries have less-developed financial markets 
characterised by low liquidity and few asset classes. Financial liberalisation in such countries 
would enable some investors to free their resources and pursue other more rewarding, liquid 
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and sophisticated investment opportunities in international markets; these outflows could lead 
to the problems referred to earlier. 
 
Each of the intermediate policy goals of the trilemma can be a double edged sword. Policy 
makers would have to assess and weigh the benefits and costs of each goal in relation to the 
country’s unique needs and circumstances before adopting any of them. Unfortunately, that 
kind of assessment is not an easy task. While it would be relatively simpler if it was possible 
to use all three intermediate policy goals at once, that is not, in terms of the trilemma 
hypothesis, possible.  
2.1.2 The Impossibility of the Simultaneous Attainment of the Three Intermediate 
Policy Goals of the Trilemma – a Theoretical Perspective 
The trilemma hypothesis is a fundamental contribution of the 1960’s Mundell-Fleming model 
(an extension of the IS-LM Neo-Keynesian model) which considers a small economy 
choosing its exchange rate regime and financial integration with global financial markets 
(Aizenman, 2010). As a matter of illustration, consider a country that has adopted a fixed 
exchange rate regime and full financial integration but is also trying to have full autonomy 
over monetary policy. Say, in an effort to reduce domestic inflation, the country raises interest 
rates to a position higher than world interest rates. In this case, ‘arbitrage theory’ in Financial 
Economics posits that foreign investors (arbitrageurs) will be attracted by the relatively high 
interest rates to invest in that country; high foreign exchange capital inflows and increased 
demand for the local currency will result, putting pressure on the local currency to appreciate. 
However, because the exchange rate is fixed, the monetary authority will have to maintain the 
value of the local currency by intervening in the foreign exchange market through purchasing 
the excess foreign currency. The local currency will be used to purchase the foreign currency, 
increasing the local reserves. The increased liquidity in the system will, unless it’s neutralized 
by open market operations, put upward pressure on the general price level; the goal of 
reducing inflation will be frustrated.  
A second scenario, similar to that presented by Mandilaras (2014), would be a central bank 
trying to boost spending by lowering interest rates relative to world rates. Lower interest rates 
would be relatively unattractive to arbitrageurs who, because of financial integration, would 
be free to sell their investment holdings in the local market and demand foreign currency to 
invest in higher yielding investments elsewhere. In order to prevent the local currency from 
depreciating against the foreign currency and hence defend a pegged exchange rate, the 
central bank would have to run down on its reserves by selling the foreign currency; this 
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would reduce liquidity in the system and, unless neutralized, negate the central bank’s initial 
objective of boosting spending.  
It would not be possible, therefore, for the central bank to exercise full monetary policy 
independence in the presence of full exchange rate stability and financial integration. What 
would work for the country to have monetary policy independence is to either give up 
financial integration by imposing controls on capital flows or float the exchange rate to allow 
it to move to a new equilibrium. Otherwise, according to the impossible trinity theory, it is 
impossible to attain optimal levels of all three intermediate policy goals at the same time. 
Some of the theories underlying the impossible trinity hypothesis (the trilemma) are 
‘uncovered interest rate parity’ and ‘arbitrage’. 
Uncovered interest rate parity, as defined by Bekaert et al. (2007), Cumby and Obstfeld 
(1982) and Francis et al. (2002), refers to a parity condition which states that the difference in 
interest rates of two countries is equal to the expected rate of change in the exchange rate 
between the currencies of the two countries. For the above examples, the uncovered interest 
rate parity would be presented mathematically as follows: 
iL – iB = E(e) 
Where iL is the interest rate of the local country, iB is the interest rate of the base country and 
E(e) is the expected rate of change in the exchange rate between the two countries. 
For instance, assuming initially the interest rate of government bonds in both the local country 
(iL) and the base country (iB) is 10%, if the local country changes its interest rate to 15% so 
that the difference in interest rates between the two countries is 5%, according to the 
uncovered interest rate parity, the exchange rate between the two countries’ currencies would 
be expected to depreciate by 5%. If the exchange rate does not change, or changes by more or 
less than 5%, an opportunity to make arbitrage profits exists.  
Arbitrage, according to Faure (2013), refers to the act of simultaneously purchasing and 
selling identical or similar financial assets with the intention of profiting from price 
differences. It involves purchasing an asset in the cheaper market and, at the same time, 
selling an identical or similar asset in the more expensive market. In short, arbitrage is a trade 
that seeks to make riskless profit by exploiting differences in the prices of identical or similar 
assets in different markets or in different forms. It exists due to market inefficiencies like the 
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absence of uncovered interest rate parity (Faure, 2013) and would tend to drive the prices to 
equality. 
Revisiting the first case, it was assumed that the local country has adopted a fixed exchange 
rate and financial integration but it is also trying to pursue monetary policy independence. If 
the country decides to raise interest rates by 5%, according to ‘uncovered interest rate parity’, 
the exchange rate is supposed to depreciate by 5%. Because the country has adopted a fixed 
exchange rate, however, an ‘arbitrage’ opportunity exists for investors to profit by purchasing 
government bonds in the local country at a lower price and selling base country government 
bonds at a higher price. This means that due to financial integration there will be capital 
inflows into the local country; capital inflows will increase the supply of foreign currency, 
increasing pressure on the exchange rate to appreciate.  The central bank intervenes by buying 
forex from the market to defend the fixed exchange rate, but in the process increases liquidity 
in the system which opposes the initial objective of the central bank of raising interest rates to 
reduce inflation. It is clear that optimal levels of each of the intermediate policy goals cannot 
be attained simultaneously; hence the trilemma. 
2.1.3 Challenges to the Validity of the Trilemma Hypothesis 
As can be seen, central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market could lead to further 
inflation by increasing the monetary base (the first case) or liquidity shortages by reducing the 
monetary base (the second case). Altinkemer (1998), Grenville (2011) and Sengupta (2015) 
point out that sterilised rather than unsterilized intervention would enable countries to use the 
trilemma intermediate policy goals at the same time. For instance, in the first scenario, in 
order to prevent the foreign exchange intervention from raising the inflation rate further, the 
central bank would sterilise the intervention by conducting a contractionary open market 
operation by selling local-currency-denominated securities to withdraw excess liquidity from 
the markets. Mandilaras (2014), however, argues that this challenge assumes that central 
banks are not limited by the extent that intervention in the foreign exchange market can be 
neutralized. 
 
The literature identifies two constraints to sterilisation that may be encountered. Firstly, 
according to Jian et al. (2011) and Mandilaras (2014), international reserves are not an 
inexhaustible resource; the more the central bank intervenes in the forex market to prevent a 
depreciation of the local against the foreign currency in an environment of fixed exchange 
rates and free capital mobility, the faster international reserves would be depleted.  The 
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sustainability of foreign exchange market intervention by the central bank is thus questionable 
in the long-run, rendering its ability to deal with the trilemma questionable. 
 
The second limit to sterilisation lies in its costs. Altinkemer (1998) argues that sterilised 
intervention is costly because it is associated with the risk of increasing interest rates as well 
as reinforcing inward capital flows. The securities that the central bank uses for sterilisation 
have to bear attractive interest rates for the sterilisation to be effective, meaning offering 
higher interest rates relative to market rates. Ultimately, all other rates in the financial system 
follow suit, thereby attracting further international capital inflows. Excessive sterilisation and 
the associated high interest rates increase the interest payment burden for the central bank, in 
turn increasing losses, which are for the account of the taxpayer. Also, as Jian et al. (2011) 
point out, the higher interest rates triggered by sterilisation can promote macro and micro 
moral hazard which can lead to distortions in the financial system. The costs associated with 
sterilisation make its long-run sustainability questionable, implying that monetary policy 
independence, in an environment of fixed exchange rates and financial integration, would also 
be unsustainable. The trilemma constraint would, therefore, be binding. 
Besides the issue of the effect of sterilisation on the trilemma, there are other arguments 
raised that question the validity of the trilemma hypothesis.  Grenville (2011) contends that 
the impossible trinity story is problematic because it assumes that (i) currencies are close 
substitutes, (ii) portfolio capital flows are mainly driven by interest rate differentials and (iii) 
foreign direct investment is driven by other factors; for example, foreign investors may be 
attracted to invest in a country because of future long-term growth prospects. This type of 
capital inflow, in Grenville’s (2011) view, would be structural rather than cyclical and would 
not easily be reversed due to short-term movements in interest rates. Clearly, the trilemma 
hypothesis does not take into account all the factors that drive capital flows. 
The existence of arguments against the trilemma hypothesis indicates the importance of an 
empirical validation of the issue; there is a growing empirical literature on the subject 
discussed later. 
2.1.4 Macroeconomic Effects of the Trilemma Intermediate Policy Goals 
One of the objectives of this study is to assess how the pursuit of the trilemma intermediate 
policy goals influences macroeconomic performance in Malawi. Accordingly, the effect of the 
pursuit of these intermediate goals on macroeconomic stability is considered. 
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2.1.4.1 Monetary Policy Independence and Macroeconomic Performance 
Monetary Policy Independence and Inflation 
It was mentioned earlier that monetary policy independence could result in either a decrease 
or an increase in inflation. Whether monetary policy independence decreases or increases the 
level, and / or volatility, of inflation, Aizenman & Ito (2011), Mandilaras (2014) and Ihnatova 
& Cẳprarua (2014) argue that this depends on the credibility of the monetary authorities. If 
the central bank is credible enough, monetary policy independence would give them the 
ability to use monetary policy as an effective tool to decrease or control inflation levels and 
volatility. If the central bank is not credible, on the other hand, Aizenman & Ito (2014) argue 
that greater monetary policy independence would allow them to abuse their power and use 
monetary policy for other undesirable objectives such as to finance fiscal deficits and 
manipulate output and inflation levels for government debt or for political reasons. These 
practices would lead to high and volatile inflation. Monetary policy independence would thus 
be good news for countries with credible central banks but bad news for countries with low 
central bank credibility. 
Monetary Policy Independence and Output 
Reasonably low and stable inflation promotes investment and consumption which are 
important components of a country’s total output or gross domestic product (GDP). In 
contrast, high and volatile inflation discourages investment and consumption.  Since inflation 
affects output, for reasons explained in the preceding section, monetary policy independence 
would also decrease or increase output depending on central bank credibility. That is, 
assuming a credible central bank, monetary policy independence, working through its effect 
on inflation, can lead to high, stable and sustainable economic growth.  If the central bank 
lacks credibility, monetary policy independence can be a source of low and volatile output 
growth (Aizenman & Ito, 2011). Hence, like the effect on inflation, monetary policy 
independence can advance or suppress economic growth or make it volatile. 
2.1.4.2 Impact of Exchange Rate Stability on Macroeconomic Performance 
Exchange Rate Stability and Inflation 
Some theoretical literature predicts that exchange rate stability should go together with low 
and stable inflation. Aizenman et al. (2010) and Mandilaras (2014) argue that long-run 
stability in the exchange rate can be seen as an indication of a central bank’s credibility in the 
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conduct of monetary policy, especially in its commitment to defend an anti-inflationary 
monetary policy stance. This can mitigate uncertainty in the economy and hence result in low 
and stable prices. 
 
A fixed exchange rate can, as argued by Hsing (2012; 2013), potentially lead to high or 
volatile inflation by subjecting the local country’s currency movements to movements in the 
anchor currency. When the anchor currency appreciates (depreciates), the local currency 
would depreciate (appreciate), so that volatility in the anchor currency would potentially 
transmit to the local currency. Volatile exchange rates breed uncertainty and eventually 
inflation volatility.  
 
Exchange rate stability can also attract large international portfolio capital inflows which can 
easily be reversed in times of macroeconomic shocks. These volatile movements in capital 
flows can increase uncertainty and volatility in the domestic country and eventually lead to 
high or volatile inflation. According to Ihnatova & Cẳprarua (2014), after the European Union 
(EU) enlargement in 2004 and 2007, new Eastern EU member countries which had adopted 
the EURO as their currency faced high capital inflows which initially generated two digit 
inflation rates and later on low inflation after the crisis. 
 
Thus, despite a well-known theoretical proposition that exchange rate stability leads to low 
and stable inflation, fixed exchange rates have the potential to generate high and volatile 
inflation. 
Exchange Rate Stability and Output 
The effect of exchange rate stability on output can be both positive and negative. Two 
positive effects stand out in literature. First, Aizenman & Ito (2011) and Hsing (2013a) assert 
that stable exchange rates can mitigate uncertainty and thereby lower both foreign exchange 
risk and interest rate risk premiums. This promotes investment, consumption and international 
trade, and in turn leads to high, stable and sustainable economic growth. Second, Aizenman 
and Glick (2009) contend that a prolonged stability in exchange rates or maintenance of fixed 
exchange rates during an economic crisis can increase the credibility of monetary authorities. 
A credible central bank enhances consumer, producer and investor confidence and thereby 
contributes to stabilising output movements. According to Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015), small 
open economies particularly benefit from the output-stabilising effect of exchange rate 
stability. 
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Among the negative effects of exchange rate stability on output is that a pegged exchange rate 
regime deprives policy makers of an easy tool for absorbing external shocks. The argument in 
the literature (Friedman, 1953 and Meade, 1951 in Ogbuagu & Ewubare, 2015) is that with a 
flexible exchange rate a country can more easily adjust to real shocks than with a fixed 
exchange rate regime where adjustments to the real exchange rate are done through relative 
price changes; these are costly and slow in a world of price rigidities. The slow adjustment 
process of the economy can slow down output growth. Aizenman & Ito (2011) argue that this 
rigidity caused by fixed exchange rates can also lead to resource misallocation, contributing to 
unbalanced and unsustainable output growth. 
Another negative impact of exchange rate stability on output relates to the effect of capital 
inflows attracted by the stable exchange rates. As previously stated, short-term capital inflows 
can easily reverse in times of external shocks, thereby contributing to output volatility through 
the investment channel (Ihnatova & Cẳprarua, 2014). Aizenman et al. (2010), however, argue 
that the volatility-enhancing effect of fixed exchange rates can be mitigated by holding high 
levels of international reserves, an issue that is still under scrutiny in literature. 
Exchange rate stability can, thus, be a desirable tool for promoting output growth and 
decreasing output volatility but it also carries the risk of actually doing the opposite.  
2.1.4.3 Impact of Financial Integration on Macroeconomic Performance 
Financial Integration and Inflation 
The theoretical relationship between financial integration and inflation can be unpredictable. 
In some circumstances, for instance when the domestic country is characterised by low 
unemployment and attractive interest rates, financial integration can lead to large capital 
inflows (direct and portfolio investment) which could put pressure on prices and wages to 
rise, in turn raising inflation. In other circumstances, however, the same increase in capital 
inflows can put pressure on the country’s currency to appreciate. In this case imports for the 
country could become cheaper, reducing inflation in the process. Similarly, Mandilaras (2014) 
puts forward that increased investment inflows can increase domestic production which could 
lead to low prices and in turn reduce inflation. 
 
It was also earlier mentioned that capital inflows in an environment of free capital mobility 
are prone to abrupt reversals in times of economic shocks. These capital movements or 
speculative attacks, according to Ihnatova & Cẳprarua (2014), have the potential of causing 
severe instability in the economy, inflation volatility inclusive. 
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Like the other two intermediate policy goals of the trilemma, therefore, financial integration 
can be a double edged sword on inflation. 
Financial Integration and Output 
Picking up from theoretical literature, financial integration in some cases is associated with 
high output growth and low output volatility but in other cases it is with low output growth 
and high output volatility.  
 
Beginning with positive effects, Aizenman & Ito (2011) believe that financial integration 
leads to output growth by allowing for more efficient allocation of resources. This is due to 
the fact that, with more financial integration, both domestic and foreign investors have the 
opportunity to invest in more profitable businesses or assets either in or outside the country. 
The returns realized from these investments should increase aggregate output. In addition, as 
mentioned before, Aizenman & Ito (2011) believe that not only can financial integration 
attract capital inflows which supplement domestic savings and investment, it can also attract 
managerial and technological knowhow which enhances factor productivity, and in turn 
aggregate output. 
 
Aizenman & Ito (2011) further contend that countries with access to international financial 
markets and with open financial markets themselves are in a better position to contain 
economic shocks due to risk sharing with other countries and portfolio diversification. 
Aizenman et al. (2010) also argue that financial integration can contribute to real exchange 
rate stability which stabilizes the economy. Macroeconomic stability in turn promotes 
economic growth. 
 
On the negative side, Hsing (2012a; 2013a) and Ihnatova & Cẳprarua (2014) suggest that 
financial integration exposes a country to the risk of abrupt capital inflows which, as 
explained previously, can lead to economic volatility and hence low and unstable output 
growth. Thus, as much as financial integration can be beneficial through enhancing output 
growth and reducing economic growth volatility, in some circumstances it can reduce 
economic growth or lead to output volatility. 
 
From the above theoretical discussion, it can be noted that the effects of each trilemma 
intermediate policy goal on the economy are not clear-cut. Each one of them can have 
desirable and undesirable effects. Perhaps that should explain the differences in choices of 
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these intermediate policy goals that countries have made and the resultant effects on their 
economies. This is why, in subsequent sections, empirical aspects of the trilemma hypothesis, 
including the macroeconomic effects of the trilemma intermediate policy goals, are examined 
so as to gain a better understanding of the trilemma concept, before focusing on Malawi in 
subsequent chapters. 
2.2 Empirical Literature 
Introduction 
The trilemma hypothesis has, to an extent, been regarded as a theoretical curiosity. Even 
though the concept has been widely accepted in academia and among policy makers, 
comprehensive empirical scrutiny of the concept is only just beginning to gain momentum. 
This is probably because, not only is it strenuous to test the constraints implied by the 
trilemma, but it is also difficult to measure a country’s extent of achievement in each of the 
intermediate policy goals of the trilemma: monetary policy independence, exchange rate 
stability and financial integration. 
Obstfeld et al. (2005) and Aizenman et al. (2008) are notable and comprehensive pioneer 
studies that developed the first methods to empirically analyze the trilemma hypothesis. The 
term ‘trilemma’ for the impossible trinity was actually brought into widespread use by 
Obstfeld & Taylor (1997) and Obstfeld et al. (2005). Few empirical studies followed after 
Obstfeld et al. (2005), perhaps because of the rigor required in the study; the majority 
emerged after Aizenman et al. (2008) developed methods for constructing indices that 
measure a country’s level of achievement in each of the trilemma intermediate policy goals. A 
majority of the studies actually have in fact been based on the Aizenman et al. (2008) 
methodology.  
The 2007-2008 global financial crisis also triggered an influx of empirical studies on the 
trilemma concept as economists tried, and are still trying, to understand and look for solutions 
to various economic and financial problems facing the world. 
This part of the chapter reviews the pioneering, and some subsequent, studies on the trilemma 
concept. As per the objectives of this study, the review concentrates on studies focused on 
analyzing the validity of the trilemma hypothesis, examining country choices over the past 
few decades and assessing the macroeconomic effects of the trilemma intermediate policy 
goals. 
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2.2.1 The Trilemma in History 
The trilemma has been widely accepted in academia and among policy makers as a major 
macroeconomic policy guiding framework, largely because the trade-offs implied by the 
trilemma have been observed in history. Aizenman & Ito (2011) observed that different 
financial architectures have endeavoured to achieve two of the trilemma intermediate policy 
goals; attempts to achieve all three have led, or at least contributed to, the breakdown of some 
historical financial systems. Some of the financial crises in history were also to some extent 
triggered by attempts to pursue all intermediate policy goals of the trilemma at the same time.   
Going as far back as the classical gold standard, Obstfeld et al. (2005) observed that the gold 
standard financial system was characterised by fixed exchange rates, unconstrained capital 
mobility but limited monetary policy independence. The main aim of the gold standard 
system, according to Obstfeld et al. (2005), was exchange rate stability which required free 
capital mobility among countries at the expense of internal price stability. During and after 
World War 1, however, governments feared that the gold standard could bring about 
inflationary and / or deflationary pressures and hence volatility (Obstfeld et al., 2005). They 
thus attempted to pursue both exchange rate and price stability; this could not happen with 
unrestricted international gold movements. As a result, according to Obstfeld et al. (2005), the 
governments had to impose controls restricting international flows of gold. This was one of 
the main reasons for the breakdown of the gold standard system. That is, the attempt to pursue 
all the three intermediate policy goals of monetary policy independence, exchange rate 
stability and financial integration during the gold standard led to its downfall.  
The Bretton Woods financial system that followed the breakdown of the gold standard also 
broke down partly due to countries trying to pursue the three intermediate policy goals of the 
trilemma at the same time. Obstfeld et al. (2005), Aizenman & Ito (2011) and Aizenman et al. 
(2010) stated that the system gave countries autonomy over monetary policy with relatively 
stable exchange rates, but it was associated with restricted capital movements. During that 
time, as Bordo (1981) mentioned, countries’ currencies were pegged to the US$ which was in 
turn convertible to gold. However, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the world financial 
structure was changing gradually. Bordo (1981) stated that other currencies (such as the 
Western European currencies) became convertible into gold and could therefore be used as 
reserve currencies. This increased international financial transactions and strengthened 
monetary interdependence; as a result the US$ became so overvalued that it was difficult to 
maintain its convertibility to gold (Bordo, 1981). In August 1971, according to Bordo (1981), 
the then president of the United States, Richard Nixon, announced that the convertibility of 
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the US$ to gold would be suspended (IMF). The increase in financial integration had made it 
difficult to maintain fixed exchange rates and monetary policy independence during the 
Bretton Woods era, an example of the trilemma in practice. 
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, countries were given the freedom to 
choose any exchange rate regime desired in combination with their policy choices on 
monetary policy independence and financial integration. Aizenman et al. (2010) noted that 
most developed countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and 
Australia, opted for free floating exchange rates to allow for monetary independence and free 
capital mobility. Some countries like Hong Kong and Eurozone member countries in recent 
decades opted for stable exchange rates and free capital mobility but had to forego monetary 
policy independence by having currency boards, as Hsing (2012a; 2012b; 2013a) noted. Most 
emerging market economies such as China and some non-emerging market developing 
economies (until recently) opted for the third combination of stable exchange rates and 
monetary independence while maintaining controls on capital mobility to some extent 
(Aizenman et al., 2010; Hsing, 2012a; 2012b; 2013a). Thus, even presently most countries 
pursue only two of the trilemma intermediate policy goals and are cautious to pursue all three. 
Strengthening the trilemma hypothesis further, historical literature provides examples of 
economic crises that are believed to have been caused by countries’ attempts to 
simultaneously achieve high levels of all the trilemma intermediate policy goals since the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. Sengupta (2015) cited the 1994-1995 Mexican peso 
crisis, the 1997-1998 Asian financial/debt crisis and the 2001-2002 Argentinean financial 
crisis as examples. 
The Asian 1997-1998 crisis, according to Patnaik and Shah (2010), is known to have been 
caused by East Asian countries’ pursuit of the combination of all the intermediate policy goals 
of the trilemma. East Asian countries had fixed exchange rate regimes (de facto dollar peg) 
and were promoting de facto financial integration, and at the same time pursuing independent 
monetary policy (Garnaut, 1998; Patnaik & Shah, 2010). First, the fixed exchange rate meant 
that foreign investors could invest in East Asia without fear of exchange rate fluctuation risk. 
Second, the financial integration implied that foreign investors could invest in and out of East 
Asia with ease. Third, as Garnaut (1998) noted, East Asian countries had interest rates higher 
than the US and some other important countries. These three points attracted large amounts of 
short-term investment inflows into the East Asian region. Garnaut (1998) noted that, while 
initially the trade balance in the region was within reasonable levels, when the trade balance 
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shifted and the economic outlook became blurred, foreign investors quickly withdrew their 
investments, triggering the 1997-1998 crisis. Some countries like Thailand had no option but 
to float and devalue their currencies after they ran out of reserves (Garnaut, 1998). Thus, the 
pursuit of all the intermediate policy goals of the trilemma is believed to have been a 
significant source of historical economic crises.  
In light of the above and other historical accounts, the trilemma hypothesis that it is 
impossible to simultaneously achieve optimal levels of monetary policy independence, 
exchange rate stability and financial integration cannot be ignored. The next section reviews 
studies that were aimed at providing empirical evidence on the validity of the trilemma 
hypothesis. 
2.2.2 The Validity of the Trilemma Hypothesis 
Historical observation and / or experience provide important insights into the validity of the 
trilemma hypothesis. However, empirical investigations which involve testing whether or not 
the trilemma hypothesis is binding are even more important. Besides, it was previously 
mentioned that theoretical literature has been found to be both for and against the validity of 
the trilemma. This section is dedicated to reviewing empirical studies on the issue. 
 
The first notable comprehensive empirical study that assessed the validity of the trilemma 
hypothesis by examining the relationships among all the trilemma intermediate policy goals 
was done by Obstfeld et al. (2005). Preceding research was focused on one, or at most two of 
the trilemma aspects, but not all three simultaneously.  
 
Obstfeld et al. (2005) assessed whether exchange-rate and capital-control regimes affected the 
extent to which a country’s interest rates diverge from world interest rates. The methodology 
involved analysing the responsiveness of local interest rates to world interest rates under 
different exchange-rate and capital-control regimes defined as the Gold Standard era (1870-
1914), the Bretton Woods era (1959-1970) and the post-Bretton Woods era (1973-2000). 
Monthly panel data for 103 countries was used. 
 
The results showed that interest rate shocks transmitted markedly and rapidly during fixed 
exchange rate episodes during the Gold Standard era (which was also associated with limited 
capital controls). In contrast, fixed exchange rate episodes in the Bretton Woods era which 
was associated with tight controls on capital mobility, were not much of a constraint on local 
interest rates, indicating that countries retained a great deal of monetary policy independence. 
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As for the post-Bretton Woods era when countries started to embrace free capital mobility, 
increased transmission of interest rate shocks among countries with fixed exchange rates was 
found, indicating limited, or the loss of, monetary policy independence. The results also 
revealed that countries with flexible exchange rate regimes, both before 1914 and in the post-
Bretton Woods era, enjoyed more monetary policy independence than countries with fixed 
rate regimes. 
 
In general, Obstfeld et al. (2005) found that monetary policy was more constrained in times of 
fixed exchange rates combined with free capital mobility than in times of flexible exchange 
rates combined with free capital mobility as well as in times of flexible exchange rates 
combined with capital controls. Support for the constraints implied by the trilemma was 
found, and is still a very relevant constraint on macroeconomic policy. 
 
Research conducted prior to that of Obstfeld et al. (2005) analysed the trilemma using similar 
approaches to the one used by Obstfeld et al. (2005), where the relationship between domestic 
and base country interest rates were assessed under different exchange rate and capital-control 
regimes. These earlier studies, however, focused on the transmission of interest rate shocks 
between countries in relation to exchange rate regimes, with little attention to capital-control 
regimes being paid. The results, nevertheless, were supported by those obtained later by 
Obstfeld et al. (2005). For instance, using panel data for the period between 1973 and 2000, 
Shambaugh (2004) considered interest rates in domestic and base countries in relation to 
exchange rate regimes in 155 countries. It was found that interest rates in countries with 
pegged exchange rates followed those of their base countries fairly closely, compared to 
countries with more flexible exchange rates. It was concluded that the trilemma would serve 
as an important guide for macroeconomic policy study. 
 
Frankel et al. (2004) studied whether the choice of exchange rate regime affects the sensitivity 
of domestic interest rates to changes in international interest rates, using a sample of 46 
countries (18 industrialised and 28 developing countries) for the period from 1970 to 1999. 
The results showed that, in the short-run, most countries pursuing flexible exchange rate 
regimes adjusted to changes in international interest rates more slowly than countries with 
fixed exchange rates; whereas in the long-run most countries, including those with flexible 
exchange rates, adjusted fully to changes in international interest rates. This suggests that 
most countries with flexible exchange rate regimes possessed a higher degree of monetary 
policy independence than their counterparts with fixed exchange rates, an implication of the 
trilemma. 
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In a more recent panel study Bleaney et al. (2013), using a similar approach to Obstfeld et al. 
(2005) found differing results; countries with pegged exchange rates but less onerous capital 
controls were associated with a higher degree of monetary policy independence than the 
trilemma constraints would imply. After accounting for peg credibility issues, however, their 
results became more consistent with the constraints of the trilemma. 
 
A different approach (the one adopted in the present study) to testing the validity of the 
trilemma hypothesis emerged in literature with an empirical study by Aizenman et al. (2008); 
this is frequently regarded in recent literature as a landmark study on empirically testing the 
trilemma hypothesis, most probably because this was the first empirical study that tested the 
constraints of the trilemma using measures of country’s levels of achievement in the trilemma 
intermediate policy goals. Unlike most previous studies which tested the trilemma by 
analysing correlations between domestic and base country interest rates, Aizenman et al. 
(2008) developed indices for measuring monetary policy independence, exchange rate 
stability and financial integration which were then used in a regression framework to assess 
the relationship among the three variables, to estimate trade-offs between them and thus to 
test if the trilemma hypothesis is binding. Panel data for 179 countries for the period between 
1970 and 2006 was used.  
 
Findings indicated that the trilemma is a binding constraint and that the relationship among 
the trilemma variables is likely linear so that their weighted sum adds up to a constant. In 
other words, an increase in the level of achievement in one trilemma variable should be 
traded-off with a decrease in either one or both of the other two trilemma variables.  These 
findings were also confirmed in subsequent studies (Aizenman et al., 2009; 2010a; 2010b; 
2011; 2012; 2013) which mostly built on the 2008 study. 
 
Recent work used the Aizenman et al. (2008) approach to test the validity of the trilemma 
hypothesis at a single country level. Hutchison et al. (2012) is one of such studies. The study 
modified the Aizenman et al. (2008) panel-data approach to suitably assess trade-offs between 
the trilemma intermediate policy goals in a time-series framework in India for the period 
between 1996 and 2009. The aim was to test the validity of the trilemma in India, analyse its 
evolution and assess its impact on the macro-economy over the study period. The findings 
confirmed that the trilemma hypothesis is a binding constraint so that there are indeed linear 
trade-offs between monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial 
integration in India.  Jian et al. (2011) applied the Aizenman et al. (2008) methodology in 
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China, and found that the weighted sum of the trilemma variables indeed added up to a 
constant, also indicating that the trilemma is binding in China. 
 
Similarly, Hsing (2012a; 2012b; 2013a; 2013b) built on the Aizenman et al. (2008) 
methodology to conduct country-specific studies in some European countries: Greece, 
Bulgaria, Brazil and Poland, respectively. The studies also found support for the trilemma. 
 
Alternative methodologies have also recently emerged in literature. Mandilaras (2014), for 
example, introduced a ‘Euclidean geometry’ methodology to test the trilemma in 123 
countries using annual data for the period between 1970 and 2012. These results were 
compared with those obtained using the Aizenman et al. (2008) methodology. Both 
approaches revealed overwhelming evidence in support for the trilemma across different 
income and geographic groups and time.  Lastly, Cortuk et al. (2012) used ‘Kalman Filter 
Analysis’ along with the Aizenman et al. (2008) approach to test for the trilemma in Turkey. 
Once again, support was found for the trilemma trade-offs. 
 
As discussed in section 2.1.5, there are theoretical arguments against the validity of the 
trilemma hypothesis, but these have not been widely analysed empirically to dispute the 
constraints implied by the trilemma. For instance, one of the arguments raised is that countries 
can pursue all the trilemma intermediate policy goals by holding sufficient foreign exchange 
reserves to enable the central bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market. China is often 
mentioned in the literature as an example of such countries. It has not, however, yet been 
proved that China is not subject to the trilemma constraints, such that it is able to achieve to 
the full extent monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration 
simultaneously. If anything, what has come out of empirical studies is that China is able to 
achieve just the middle levels of these trilemma intermediate policy goals, and not full levels 
(Aizenman et al., 2010). This basically means that China still faces the constraints of the 
trilemma. Besides, Hutchison et al. (2012) incorporated the influence of international reserves 
in their assessment of the trilemma in China. They found that the international reserves 
variable was not statistically significant in their model and concluded that international 
reserves do not mitigate the trilemma trade-offs in China. Nevertheless, understanding the 
middle ground position of some countries like China in the context of the trilemma is still a 
work in progress. 
 
Similarly, Grenville (2011) strongly opposed the validity of the trilemma. One argument 
mentioned is that East Asian countries (China included) have been able to pursue, to some 
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extent, monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration at the 
same time; therefore it the trilemma may be regarded as not holding in East Asian countries. 
This argument could, however, be a misunderstanding of the implications of the trilemma 
hypothesis which asserts that countries are constrained from achieving ‘to the full extent’ the 
three intermediate policy goals of the trilemma simultaneously, not ‘middle levels’. Also, as 
mentioned in section 2.2.1, the attempt to pursue all the trilemma intermediate policy goals in 
East Asia triggered a financial crisis in 1997-1998. Further empirical evidence is thus required 
to support the claim that the trilemma hypothesis does not hold in East Asia. 
 
A further example advanced by Grenville (2011) in opposing the trilemma is the fact that 
Singapore is able to pursue monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and 
financial integration simultaneously. It is, however, noted that Singapore implements its 
monetary policy through the exchange rate; it does not try to control its interest rates which 
closely follow those of the United States. Clearly, this is the trilemma in practice: Singapore 
has lost the ability to set its own interest rates by choosing to control exchange rates and 
embrace financial integration. 
 
It may be argued that the majority of studies focused on testing the validity of the trilemma 
found the constraints implied by the trilemma to be valid. There are few, if any, 
comprehensive empirical studies that provide tangible evidence against the trilemma 
hypothesis. Most papers that argue against the validity of the trilemma provide unsatisfactory 
empirical evidence to support their claim and most of their arguments are based on 
misunderstandings of the basic implications of the trilemma or ‘impossible trinity’ hypothesis. 
 
It is worth mentioning that most studies on the validity of the trilemma were done in 
developed countries, especially in Europe, and in emerging market developing countries. A 
few studies that incorporated non-emerging market developing countries are panel-data 
studies. There are few, if any, single-country studies in non-emerging market developing 
countries and this is the area at which the current research is directed.  
 
The next section provides a review of how the trilemma intermediate policy goals have 
evolved in different income groups. 
2.2.3 Evolution of the Trilemma Configurations in Different Income Groups 
Countries’ choices of the trilemma intermediate policy goals have evolved over time. This is 
true for all income groups: developed countries, emerging market developing countries and 
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non-emerging market developing countries. Choices have been similar among countries of the 
same group but different across the groups. This is probably because countries in different 
income groups encounter different challenges and have different needs, whereas countries 
within the same income group may face similar challenges and needs. 
 
There are quite a number of studies, both panel and single-country, that have analyzed the 
evolution of the trilemma intermediate policy goals in different income groups. This section 
reviews the patterns that have been observed in each group. 
2.2.3.1 Developed Countries 
Aizenman (2010) showed that after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s, 
most developed countries embraced flexible exchange rates as they slowly moved towards 
greater financial integration and monetary policy independence. Beginning in the early 1990s, 
financial integration accelerated and has since been very high for most countries in this 
income group, as noted by Aizenman (2010), Aizenman & Ito (2011) and Aizenman et al. 
(2008; 2009; 2010). At the same time, however, according to Aizenman (2010) and Aizenman 
et al. (2010), monetary policy independence started to decline.  Towards the end of the 1990s, 
as monetary policy independence continued to decline and financial integration continued to 
accelerate, exchange rate stability for this group increased significantly, reflecting the 
introduction of the Euro in 1999 (Aizenman, 2010; Aizenman & Ito, 2011; Aizenman et al., 
2008; 2009; 2010). Developed countries outside the Eurozone still however, maintained some 
degree of monetary policy independence and flexible exchange rates.  
Country-specific studies have, however, shown varying patterns for this income group. Hsing 
(2012a) found that for Greece, monetary policy independence and exchange rate stability has 
been the dominant combination over the study period (1970 to 2010). As a member of the 
Eurozone, however, Greece is moving towards greater financial integration and exchange rate 
stability while giving up monetary policy independence. In another country-specific study, 
Hsing (2013b) found that in Poland the policy combination of monetary policy independence 
and exchange rate stability had been prevalent since 1991. This is probably because, during 
the study period, Poland was pursuing inflation targeting while planning to join the ERM II. 
The varying results from panel-data and country-specific studies indicate that, while insights 
can be drawn from panel-data studies, country specific studies are necessary if the aim is to 
understand the trilemma in a specific country. 
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2.2.3.2 Emerging Market Developing Countries 
The level of exchange rate stability improved across countries from all income groups after 
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s. For emerging market developing 
countries, however, Aizenman et al. (2008; 2009; 2010) observed that the degree of exchange 
rate stability improved only until the early 1990s when it started to deteriorate, financial 
integration continued to increase, albeit slowly compared to developed countries, and 
monetary policy independence lagged within intermediate levels, especially since the early 
2000s. 
Aizenman & Ito (2011) note that, over the last few decades, most emerging market 
developing countries have moved away from corner positions of the trilemma policy variables 
to pursue intermediate levels in each variable. This is to say, unlike developed countries, most 
emerging market developing countries have retained some degree of monetary policy 
independence and have moved towards an intermediate level of exchange rate flexibility in 
form of either managed flexible exchange rates or crawling pegs while allowing for a middle 
level of capital mobility. Aizenman & Ito (2011) believe that this intermediate position in 
emerging market countries has been made possible by accumulating sizeable amounts of 
foreign exchange reserves which central banks could use as a buffer against unfavourable 
economic fluctuations. The convergence in the trilemma intermediate policy goals and the 
resultant accumulation of international reserves, according to Aizenman et al. (2009), 
accelerated in the wake of the 1997-1998 East Asian crisis. 
These developments have, however, been uneven among the emerging market developing 
economies. Aizenman et al. (2008; 2009) observed that Asian economies have exhibited more 
policy convergence and hold larger amounts of international reserves compared to Latin 
American emerging economies. On the other hand, Latin American emerging market 
economies have liberalised their financial markets more rapidly at the cost of monetary policy 
independence and exchange rate stability compared to their Asian counterparts.  Aizenman & 
Sengupta (2013) studied the evolution of the trilemma in China and India from 1990 to 2010. 
A unique pattern for the evolution of the trilemma in China relative to other emerging market 
economies was observed. China prioritised exchange rate stability as a tool for 
macroeconomic management over monetary independence and financial integration during 
the study period. India, on the other hand, exhibited a pattern similar to that found using panel 
data for emerging markets; that is, intermediate levels (Aizenman & Sengupta, 2013).  India’s 
pursuit of intermediate levels of the trilemma configurations was also confirmed by Sengupta 
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and Sengupta (2013; 2014), using updated data and a different method for measuring 
exchange rate stability. 
Hsing (2013a) analysed the evolution of trilemma policy configurations in Brazil. His results 
also showed that over the study period, on average, Brazil placed approximately equal 
weights on all the three trilemma intermediate policy goals, thereby confirming the patterns 
revealed for overall emerging market economies using panel-data studies. 
2.2.3.3 Non-emerging Market Developing Countries 
The evolution of the trilemma for non-emerging market developing countries has been 
different from the other two income groups. Aizenman (2010), Aizenman et al. (2010) and 
Aizenman & Ito (2011) found that while developed countries and emerging market 
developing countries have greatly increased their capital account openness over the last few 
decades, non-emerging market developing countries have lagged behind. Instead, non-
emerging market developing countries have prioritized exchange rate stability, with some 
fluctuations, since the 1970s (Aizenman et al., 2010; Aizenman & Ito, 2011). A higher level 
of monetary policy independence compared to both developed countries and emerging market 
developing countries has been pursued. Sub-Saharan African countries, especially, have 
pursued higher levels of monetary policy independence and exchange rate stability (with 
some fluctuations) while lagging considerably in financial integration compared to other 
regions. Recently though, Sub-Saharan African countries have started to embrace flexible 
exchange rates and financial integration, but the progress is less marked (Aizenman et al., 
2009). 
 
Currently there are a few, if any, known single-country studies that have analyzed the 
evolution of the trilemma intermediate policy goals in non-emerging market developing 
countries. Single country studies would be important to confirm the results found by panel-
data studies. As seen in developed and emerging market developing countries, the results that 
were found for an income group as a whole may not necessarily be true for individual 
countries. This is why, apart from determining the position where Malawi currently stands in 
terms of the trilemma, this study would provide some insight into the evolution of the 
trilemma configurations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Recent single-country studies on the trilemma 
concept in this region are especially lacking. 
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2.2.4 Previous Research Findings on the Impact of the Trilemma Intermediate Policy 
Goals on the Economy 
Section 2.1.6 considered theoretical aspects of how each of the trilemma intermediate policy 
goals influences the macro-economy, especially with regards to inflation and output. This 
section reviews the empirical support of the theory. Both panel and single-country studies are 
covered. 
2.2.4.1 Impact of Monetary Policy Independence on the Macro-economy 
Monetary Policy Independence and Inflation 
Empirical studies on the effects of monetary policy independence on the level and volatility of 
inflation found mixed results. To begin with, Aizenman et al. (2008) found that greater 
monetary policy independence had a positive effect on inflation volatility, especially for 
commodity exporters. This is not surprising, as greater monetary policy independence should 
give policy makers the ability to use monetary policy as a tool to control fluctuations in 
inflation.  Aizenman et al. (2008) also found that, in the medium term, countries with greater 
monetary policy independence experienced higher levels of inflation compared to those with 
lower levels of independence. The effect was also found to be more pronounced in developing 
countries (including both emerging and non-emerging economies) than in developed 
countries.  
On the contrary, Hutchison et al. (2012), who applied the Aizenman et al. (2008) 
methodology to a single country-study (India) for the period between 1996 and 2009, found 
that greater monetary independence has a positive effect on the level of inflation in India, but 
no significant effect on inflation volatility. Hsing (2012b; 2013b), also using the Aizenman et 
al. (2008) methodology in single-country studies (Bulgaria and Poland) found no significant 
effect of monetary policy independence on either the volatility or the level of inflation. 
Monetary Policy Independence and Output 
Regarding the impact of monetary policy independence on output, empirical studies also 
produced mixed results. Aizenman et al. (2008) found a significant dampening effect of 
monetary policy independence on output volatility. That is, countries with greater monetary 
policy independence experience less output volatility in comparison to countries with a lower 
degree of monetary policy independence. This output-volatility-decreasing effect of monetary 
policy independence seems to complement the inflation-volatility-decreasing effect found in 
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the same study, as mentioned in the preceding section. As previously mentioned in section 
2.1.6.1, theory predicts that with monetary policy independence, stabilisation measures should 
reduce inflation volatility, increasing certainty in the economy and hence reducing 
fluctuations in output. Aizenman et al. (2010) pointed out that this output-volatility-
decreasing effect of monetary policy independence may be the reason developing countries, 
especially non-emerging market ones, are reluctant to give up their monetary policy 
independence. 
A similar result was found in a single-country study for Greece. Hsing (2012a) found that 
greater monetary policy independence reduced output volatility.  As for the level of output, 
Hsing (2012b) found that monetary policy independence reduced the output growth rate in 
both Bulgaria and (Hsing (2013a)) in Brazil.  Hsing (2013b), however, found no significant 
effect of monetary policy independence on either the level or volatility of output in Poland. 
Similarly, Ihnatova & Cẳprarua (2014) found no significant impact of monetary policy 
independence on macroeconomic volatility in non-euro European countries over the period 
between 1999 and 2010. 
Empirical studies have, thus, provided mixed results on the effect of monetary policy 
independence on the economy, particularly on levels and volatility of inflation and output. 
This tends to be in line with theory which predicts that monetary policy independence can 
yield positive effects at times and negative effects at other times. 
2.2.4.2 Impact of Exchange Rate Stability on the Macro-economy 
Exchange Rate Stability and Inflation 
As mentioned above, exchange rate stability has been the preferred choice for many countries, 
including those in the Euro-zone as well as some emerging market and non-emerging market 
developing economies. Whether exchange rate stability has yielded positive benefits or not is 
an empirical question. 
Aizenman et al. (2008) observed that countries with higher levels of exchange rate stability 
experience lower levels of inflation; these results were confirmed in later panel studies 
(Aizenman, 2010; Aizenman et al., 2010). A few single-country studies also found the 
negative relationship between exchange rate stability and the level of inflation rate: One such 
is Hsing (2013a) which found that more exchange rate stability is associated with lower levels 
of inflation rate in Brazil. 
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Regarding the effect on inflation volatility, Hutchison et al. (2012) found that exchange rate 
stability had a dampening effect on inflation volatility in India; higher levels of exchange rate 
stability reduced volatile fluctuations in inflation. Hutchison et al. (2012) further observed 
that this inflation-volatility-dampening effect of exchange rate stability in India worked 
through stabilising the prices of imports commodities.  These results support the theory which 
predicts the ability of stable exchange rates to reduce and stabilise inflation. 
Other studies, however, found no significant relationship between exchange rate stability and 
inflation. For instance, Hsing (2012a) reported that in Greece exchange rate stability is not a 
significant factor in determining either the level of or the volatility in, inflation. Likewise, 
Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015) found no significant short-run impact of exchange rate stability 
on either the inflation rate or inflation volatility in Nigeria.  Empirical studies thus indicate 
that the impact of exchange rate stability on the level and volatility of inflation can vary 
across countries, probably because of the different circumstances under which the policy 
operates in each country. 
Exchange Rate Stability and Output 
Regarding the effects of exchange rate stability on output, the evidence is also mixed. While 
some studies indicated that exchange rate stability contributed to high output growth and 
reduced output volatility, others found either the opposite or no significant effect at all. Hsing 
(2012b; 2013b) found that greater exchange rate stability increased real output growth rate in 
Bulgaria and Poland. Similarly, Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015) found a significant positive 
impact of exchange rate stability on output in Nigeria, albeit with a lag. These results are 
consistent with a theoretical proposition that stable exchange rates should enhance investment 
and consumption and hence output.  
Contrary to the above, Hsing (2012a) found no significant effect of exchange rate stability on 
either the level of, or volatility in, output in Greece; this was despite the country attaining a 
relatively high level of exchange rate stability during the study period.  Other single-country 
and panel studies also found no significant effect of exchange rate stability on output 
volatility; for instance, Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015) for Nigeria in the short-run and Ihnatova 
& Cẳprarua (2014) for non-Euro European countries. Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015), however, 
found that in the long-run, exchange rate stability reduced output volatility in the long-run.  
Somewhat counterintuitively, Hsing (2013b) found that exchange rate stability led to 
increased output volatility in Poland.  
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Aizenman et al. (2008) also considered the role of other factors in enhancing the impacts of 
the trilemma intermediate policy goals on macroeconomic variables. Regarding the effect of 
exchange rate stability on output, it was found that exchange rate stability has a significant 
favourable impact on output volatility only when coupled with international foreign exchange 
reserves, but on its own more exchange rate stability has no significant impact. This is to say 
countries with stable exchange rates are able to reduce output volatility by holding 
international reserves which they use to maintain the value of the exchange rate. Further, the 
mere existence of high levels of reserves may serve to deter speculation against the currency 
and thus maintain stability. In countries with inadequate levels of foreign exchange reserves, 
exchange rate stability is not an effective output stabilisation tool. 
Aizenman et al. (2008) also found that the impact of exchange rate stability on output 
volatility also depended on a country’s level of financial sector development; exchange rate 
stability pursued under medium-level financial development increased output volatility. In 
most emerging markets, however, according to Aizenman et al. (2008), the effect is mitigated 
by holding sizeable amounts of foreign exchange reserves (levels higher that 19% - 20% of 
GDP).  
It would seem that the effect of exchange rate stability on output is complicated. Several 
factors play a role on how exchange rate stability affects the macro economy. As such 
countries tend to experience different effects depending on their unique needs and 
circumstances. 
2.2.4.3 Impact of Financial Integration on the Macro-economy 
Financial Integration and Inflation 
As mentioned earlier, theoretical literature postulates that financial integration can be a double 
edged sword insofar as its effects on inflation are concerned; it can lead to either reductions or 
increases in the level of, and volatility in the inflation rate. 
A majority of empirical studies on the subject found that financial integration reduces the 
level of inflation. This is probably because, as previously mentioned, policy makers in 
financially open economies have greater discipline enforced upon them so as to remain 
competitive in global markets. Aizenman et al. (2010) argue that this is especially the case in 
emerging market developing countries. Other examples of empirical studies that found the 
inflation-reducing effect of financial integration include Hsing (2012a) in Greece, Hsing 
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(2013a) in Brazil, Hsing (2013b) in Poland, Mandilaras (2014) in various country groups and 
Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015) in Nigeria.  
Regarding the effect of financial integration on inflation volatility, most studies found that 
financial integration reduces volatility in inflation. To mention a few, Hsing (2012a; 2013a; 
2013b) found that more financial integration reduced inflation volatility in Greece, Brazil and 
Poland. Ihnatova & Cẳprarua (2014) found the same effect of financial integration in a panel-
data study for Central and Eastern Europe countries. Similarly, Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015) 
came to the same conclusion for Nigeria. 
Contrary to the above, Hutchison et al. (2012) found financial integration to be associated 
with higher inflation volatility in India. This, according to Aizenman et al. (2008), could be a 
result of the country’s exposure to volatile short-term international capital flows which are 
common in open emerging market developing countries. 
Depending on country characteristics, much as financial integration can reduce both the level 
of and volatility in inflation, it also has the potential to increase inflation volatility.  
Financial Integration and Output 
The impact of financial integration on output has been explored in quite a number of studies. 
An overview of these indicates support for the theoretical proposition that the effect of 
financial integration on output, like the other two trilemma intermediate policy goals, is 
ambiguous. In some circumstances it can enhance output growth and stability while in other 
cases it can inhibit growth and induce volatility in output.  
Beginning with an example of studies that found a positive effect of financial integration on 
the level of output, Klein & Olivei (2008), in a panel-data study for the period 1976 to 1995, 
found that countries with open capital accounts grew faster than those with closed accounts. It 
was indicated, however, that this result may have been driven by a relatively large share of 
developed countries in the sample.  For some countries, financial integration is no guarantee 
of economic growth; it may instead be a recipe for low growth. For instance, Hsing (2012b) 
showed that financial integration in Bulgaria reduced the output growth rate. For still others, 
financial integration is not even a significant factor on output. Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015) 
found that financial integration did not have a significant influence on output growth in 
Nigeria. 
As regards the impact of financial integration on output volatility, the findings are also mixed. 
In single-country studies, Hsing (2012a; 2013a; 2013b) found that financial integration 
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reduced output volatility in Greece, Brazil and Poland. Ihnatova & Cẳprarua (2014) found the 
same result for Central and Eastern Europe countries in a panel-data study. Similarly, 
Aizenman et al. (2008) showed that more financially integrated commodity exporting 
countries were associated with reduced volatility in output. Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015), 
however, found no significant effect of financial integration on output volatility in the short-
run but had the predicted effect in the long-run. 
Aizenman et al. (2008) argued that the effect of financial integration on output volatility 
depended on a country’s level of financial development. For developing countries, the study 
showed that greater financial integration has an output-volatility-reducing effect in countries 
with a high degree of financial development but a volatility-increasing effect in countries with 
a low degree of financial development.  
Thus, as theoretical literature predicts, the impact of financial integration on output varies 
across countries. Some may benefit from financial integration through increased output 
growth or reduced output volatility while others may be severely affected by reduced output 
growth levels or increased volatility. 
It is worth mentioning that Aizenman et al. (2008) compared the economic performance of 
emerging and non-emerging market developing countries; emerging markets outperformed 
non-emerging markets in terms of average economic growth rates. Aizenman & Ito (2011) 
also found that emerging market developing countries, on average, experience lower output 
volatility than non-emerging markets. It was also found that emerging market countries with 
higher levels of international reserves experienced lower output volatility compared with 
emerging markets with lower levels of international reserves. As discussed previously, most 
studies, including Aizenman et al. (2008), revealed that emerging market developing 
countries have been pursuing intermediate levels of all the trilemma intermediate policy goals 
while holding large amounts of international reserves. Aizenman et al. (2008) accordingly 
proposed that it could be the pursuit of intermediate levels of the trilemma intermediate policy 
goals coupled with accumulation of international reserves that contributes to the high 
economic performance in emerging markets. Although this issue is currently one of the focus 
areas of research relating to the trilemma, it is not taken further here.  
2.3 Summary and Conclusion 
The trilemma hypothesis, also called the ‘impossible trinity’ is one of the few macroeconomic 
policy frameworks that have stood the test of time. It is a hypothesis that has been relevant, 
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and is becoming more so, in today’s world. This is mostly because the trade-offs among 
monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration, implied by 
the trilemma, have been observed throughout history. Also, most studies that assessed its 
validity found the trilemma to be a binding constraint, even though empirical evaluation of 
the concept is just gaining momentum. Some theoretical literature, however, argues against 
the validity of the trilemma, pointing out that it is based on assumptions or arguments that 
may not be true in the real world. But there is yet to be convincing empirical evidence to 
dispute the trilemma trade-offs. 
Some studies analyzed the evolution of country choices of the trilemma intermediate policy 
goals over time and found that developed countries, emerging market and non-emerging 
market developing countries have differed in their choices. On aggregate, developed 
countries, largely influenced by countries in the Eurozone, have moved towards greater 
financial integration and exchange rate stability at the expense of monetary policy 
independence. Emerging market developing countries have moved towards intermediate 
levels of all the trilemma intermediate policy goals whereas non-emerging market developing 
countries have prioritized exchange rate stability and monetary policy independence over 
financial integration. Single country studies, however, have shown varying results. 
It has also been observed that empirical studies that assessed the impact of the trilemma 
intermediate policy goals on the macro economy produced mixed results. As predicted by 
theory, while each of the trilemma intermediate policy goals may contribute to low and stable 
inflation, they all also have the potential to induce high and volatile inflation. Similarly, much 
as the trilemma intermediate policy goals may each lead to high and stable output growth, 
they may also hinder growth and lead to volatility in output. Thus, it is not obvious what is 
best. The impact of the trilemma intermediate policy goals on the economy depends on 
country-specific factors; this indicates the importance of single-country studies if the aim is to 
understand the constraints of the trilemma and their effects in particular economies. 
Empirical studies on the validity, evolution and macroeconomic effects of the trilemma have 
been concentrated in developed and emerging market developing countries. There are a few 
studies focused on non-emerging market developing countries, most of which use panel-data; 
the results of panel-data studies may, however, not be generally applicable.  
The rest of the thesis focuses on the trilemma in Malawi. The next chapter describes how the 
three policies (monetary policy, exchange rate policy and financial liberalization or 
integration) have evolved in Malawi over the last few decades. It also analyzes how the 
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macro-economy in terms of levels and volatility of inflation and output has performed over 
the review period. This sets the broad context for the study before econometric analyses are 
conducted to assess the trade-offs of the trilemma and the impacts of the trilemma 
intermediate policy goals on the economy in Malawi. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MALAWI’S ECONOMY AND THE EVOLUTION OF MONETARY AND 
EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES AND FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION 
Introduction 
Malawi has pursued different forms of monetary and exchange rate policy, and financial 
liberalisation, since the country gained independence from colonial rule in 1964. The choice 
in the macroeconomic policies at particular points in time has been driven by various factors, 
both internal and external. Despite numerous changes in their design and implementation, 
however, macroeconomic policies in Malawi have always been aimed at achieving 
macroeconomic stability in form of stable prices and exchange rates which are believed to 
promote investment, employment and hence sustainable economic growth.  
This chapter describes how the three macroeconomic policies: monetary policy, exchange rate 
policy and financial liberalisation, have evolved in Malawi over the last few decades while 
highlighting how the economy has performed in different periods of the evolution. It also 
describes the structure of Malawi’s economy and financial system. The aim is to illuminate 
the environment or context in which this study is set; the chapter should assist in 
understanding the rationale for assessing the extent and macroeconomic effects of the trade-
offs between monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration 
in Malawi, as implied by the trilemma. It should also provide a basis for understanding the 
results of the study. 
The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section describes the evolution of the 
three policies mentioned above, and the second provides an overview of Malawi’s economy 
and financial system. 
3.1 Evolution of Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Policy and Financial Liberalisation 
in Malawi (1964-2015) 
The evolution of monetary policy, exchange rate policy and financial liberalisation in Malawi 
can be described in terms of four distinct periods: the pre-liberalisation period (from 1964 to 
mid-1980s), the financial liberalisation period (from late 1980s to1994), the post-liberalisation 
period (from 1995 to 2012) and the most recent period or current state (2012 to 2015). 
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3.1.1  Pre-Liberalisation Period (1964 to mid-1980s) 
When Malawi gained independence in 1964, the financial system that the country inherited 
was perceived to be tailored towards serving the needs of the expatriate community. The 
banking system, especially, was perceived to exclude local entrepreneurs by imposing 
unfavourable lending rates and collateral requirements on small businesses and unreasonably 
high charges for normal banking services (Gondwe, 2001 in Ngalawa & Viegi, 2011).  
In an effort to correct the distortions and hence promote local entrepreneurs, the newly 
independent government adopted policies that allowed the government to exercise direct 
control over the financial system. For instance, the new government imposed direct controls 
on interest rates and credit. Chipeta & Mkandawire (1991) note that the government dictated 
commercial bank lending and deposit rates, as well as assigning credit quotas to borrowers. 
The agricultural sector, according to Chipeta & Mkandawire (1991), was particularly 
favoured with regard to lending rates and credit quotas as government aimed to promote the 
country’s economic growth through agricultural production. During this time, a fixed 
exchange rate regime was adopted by pegging the Kwacha to the British Pound. According to 
Ngalawa & Viegi (2011), the government also imposed ceilings on prices of selected 
commodities and onerous exchange controls to limit cross border flows.  
In summary, after obtaining independence in 1964, the Malawi government adopted more 
direct tools for monetary policy, a fixed exchange rate system and onerous exchange and 
financial controls. This was in an effort to stabilise domestic prices and exchange rates, to 
promote output growth, and to maintain sustainable balance of payments. 
To some extent, these objectives were achieved in the 1970s. The country registered relatively 
high growth in output, averaging above 6 percent in the 1970s and reaching a record high of 
16.2 percent in 1971, as shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
Data Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Figure 3.1. GDP Growth Rate (Annual %)
40 
 
Towards the end of the 1970s, however, the country’s economy experienced negative internal 
and external shocks. Some of the notable shocks mentioned by Mangani (2011) include the 
global oil crisis in 1979 and drought in 1980. Most importantly, civil war in the neighbouring 
country, Mozambique, intensified during this time which not only triggered an influx of 
refugees into Malawi but also disrupted the country’s cost-effective rail route to the Beira and 
Nacala ports in Mozambique (Mwanamvekha, 1994 in Mangani, 2011). These factors 
triggered a deep recession in Malawi which persisted from the late 1970s through to the early 
1980s, with the economy’s output shrinking by 5.3 percent at the bottom of this down-turn in 
1981, as indicated in Figure 3.1. 
The persistence of the recession and failure of the economy to adjust to these shocks forced 
the government to review the country’s macroeconomic policy framework; from the mid-
1980’s the government embarked on a process of liberalising the financial system, moving 
away from direct government control. 
3.1.2 Financial Liberalisation Period (from late 1980s to 1994) 
Financial liberalisation was aimed at enhancing not only the competitiveness of the financial 
sector but also its efficiency. The programme was a phased process that started with the 
abandonment of direct for indirect monetary controls by the government in the late 1980s. 
Lending and deposit rates, according to Mwabutwa (2014), were partially deregulated in July 
1987 and April 1988; commercial banks were given the authority to determine their own 
lending and deposit rates, but were mandated to seek prior approval from the central bank 
before effecting any changes to the rates. Chipeta & Mkandawire (1991) note that credit 
ceilings were scrapped in 1988 and preferential lending rates to the agricultural sector 
abolished in January 1990. Complete deregulation of interest rates which gave commercial 
banks full independence in setting their own interest rates without prior approval from the 
Reserve Bank was formally effected in May 1990, as indicated by Ngalawa & Viegi (2011). 
The reforms necessitated a review of the RBM Act of 1964 and the Banking Act of 1965 in 
May 1989 and December 1989, respectively. With the revised RBM and Banking Acts and 
the reforms on interest rates, the Reserve Bank changed monetary policy tools from direct to 
indirect. Two monetary policy instruments, the Liquidity Reserve Requirement (LRR) and the 
Discount Window Facility, were introduced (Ngalawa & Viegi, 2011). The Liquidity Reserve 
Requirement is the proportion of total deposits that the commercial banks are mandated to 
hold as reserves with the central bank for liquidity purposes. The Discount Window, now 
called the Lombard Facility is, according to Ngalawa & Viegi (2011), the facility that enables 
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banks and discount houses to borrow from the Reserve Bank when faced with liquidity 
shortages. The Bank Rate was simultaneously introduced as the interest rate on short-term 
RBM loans to banks or discount houses. Ngalawa & Viegi (2011) note that the Bank Rate, 
now called the Policy Rate, became a very powerful indicator of the monetary policy stance 
and a benchmark for all other rates in the financial system, including commercial banks’ 
lending and deposit rates and yields on government securities. 
During this time, the Reserve Bank was targeting the level of reserve money as a framework 
for monetary policy (Banda, 2004 in Ngalawa & Viegi, 2011). Depending on its objectives, 
the RBM would set a reserve money target and use the Liquidity Reserve Requirement and 
the Bank Rate to achieve that target. Banda (2004) in Ngalawa & Viegi (2011) argues that the 
rationale for the use of reserve money targeting was to balance the demand for, and supply of, 
money in the market with the aim of achieving price stability. However, according to 
Ngalawa & Viegi (2011), the system operated as if the Reserve Bank also targeted short-term 
interest rates through adjustments in the Bank rate. 
Besides monetary policy, exchange rate policy was also revised during this reform period. 
Mangani (2012) notes that the country moved from a fixed to a floating-rate regime in 
February, 1994. Simwaka & Mkandawire (2011) argue that this became necessary due to 
economic instability arising from acute foreign exchange shortages that hit the country when 
donors suspended their balance of payments support in order to coerce the country to adopt 
multiparty democratic political system away from the existing dictatorship. Figure 3.1 
indicates that the output instability experienced during this time was perhaps the worst in the 
country’s history. 
According to Simwaka & Mkandawire (2011), it was believed that, among other benefits, a 
flexible exchange rate system would reduce economic instability as it would improve the 
country’s export competitiveness on the international market, allow efficient allocation of 
foreign exchange, reduce speculative attacks on the Kwacha and restore or improve investor 
and donor confidence in the country. 
Indeed the floatation of the exchange rate opened the country to international markets. Among 
other things, as mentioned in Mangani (2012) and Ngalawa & Viegi (2011), the flexible 
exchange rate led to the relaxation of some exchange control regulations and the 
establishment of foreign exchange bureaux (bureaux de change), foreign currency 
denominated accounts (FCDAs), a forward foreign exchange market, foreign exchange 
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options and currency swaps. Besides, Mangani (2012) noted that, immediately after the 
country adopted multiparty democracy in 1994, donor support resumed. 
Nominal output growth picked up between 1994 and 1995, with the highest point recorded at 
16.7 percent in 1995 as shown in Figure 3.1. However, as depicted in Figure 3.2, the free 
floating exchange rate was associated with high inflation which reached a record high of 98.1 
percent in July 1995. This reflects, as Simwaka & Mkandawire (2011) argue, that Malawi has 
a high pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations to inflation because of the high proportion 
of import prices in the CPI. 
 
Data Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) 
 
3.1.3 Post-Liberalisation Period (1995 to 2012)  
Towards the end of 1995, in order to curb inflation, monetary authorities decided to adopt a 
managed-float instead of a freely-floating exchange rate (Mwabutwa, 2014). The Kwacha was 
allowed to fluctuate within a specified band and the central bank managed the value of the 
Kwacha by intervening in the foreign exchange market when deemed necessary. 
The Kwacha floated within a narrow band until towards the end of 1997, by which time 
inflation had been lowered to desirable levels (as low as 6.3 percent in July 1997 in Figure 
3.2). Having achieved the inflation target, monetary authorities relaxed their stance to 
promote the country’s competiveness; this took the form of a crawling-peg, according to 
Simwaka & Mkandawire (2011).  
By 1998, when the monetary authorities were satisfied that the country had gained sufficient 
international competiveness, the exchange rate was once again allowed to float; the exchange 
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rate was to be determined by market forces of demand and supply, and Authorised Foreign 
Exchange Dealers (AFEDs) played a larger part in determining the exchange rate.  
During this time, however, especially in late 1990s and early 2000s, the exchange rate became 
more volatile; this was accompanied by volatility in the inflation rate and an economic 
contraction (as indicated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Simwaka & Mkandawire (2011) believe that 
the economic instability during this time emanated from (i) opening the economy to 
international markets, (ii) droughts that hit the country in early 2000s and (iii) the suspension 
of the first IMF Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF). The latter, as noted by Mangani 
(2011), may have been contributed to by the fact that the country had developed a culture of 
laxity in fiscal discipline; this led to high levels of fiscal deficits (as high as 11.6 percent of 
GDP in 2002), higher domestic borrowing, increased interest rates and the crowding out of 
private investment. 
Consequently, as argued by Mangani (2011), the country reverted to a fixed exchange rate 
regime in August 2003. The Kwacha was devalued and pegged to the US dollar at K108 per 
dollar. As shown in Figure 3.3, the peg was maintained until April 2012, albeit with some 
adjustments necessitated by economic factors. For instance, the exchange rate was recorded at 
USD/MWK123 in July 2005, USD/MWK139 in May 2006, USD/MWK151 and 
USD/MWK166 in April 2012. This is why the exchange rate system that existed between 
2003 and April 2012; the regime, according to Lungu (2015), is often referred as a de facto 
peg.   
 
Data Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) 
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In terms of economic performance, between 2003 and 2009, the economy did reasonably 
well. Inflation averaged 10.9 percent during the period, as indicated in Figure 3.2. Output 
growth first declined from 5.5 percent in 2003 to 2.1 percent in 2006 but picked up between 
2007 and 2009, registering 9.5 percent in 2007, 8.3 percent in 2008 and 9.0 percent in 2009, 
as shown in Figure 3.1. 
Mangani (2011) suggests that the positive economic performance during this period was 
attributable to major policy shifts in economic management (including improved fiscal 
discipline) following a change of government in 2004, the country’s improved relations with 
donors and favourable weather conditions for agriculture.  
In 2010 and 2011, however, the situation turned around. The economy started to contract as 
relations with some major donors soured which led to acute shortages of foreign exchange. 
According to Lungu (2015), it was believed that the Kwacha was overvalued and authorities 
made a decision to float the currency and further liberalise the foreign exchange market in 
May 2012. 
Thus, during the financial liberalisation period and the period up to 2012, monetary policy 
evolved from direct tools to indirect ones with the introduction of the bank rate, the liquidity 
reserve requirement and the discount window facility. This may imply that monetary policy 
during this time would still be independent but the possibility of reduced independence 
increased. The exchange rate regime changed back and forth between fixed-rate, managed-
float, crawling-peg and free-float. Exchange controls were gradually loosened, indicating the 
country’s embrace of integration with the international community. These changes in 
monetary policy, exchange rate policy and financial liberalisation/integration possibly had an 
impact on macroeconomic variables. One of the goals of this study is to assess the impact of 
the three policies on inflation and output. 
3.1.4 Most Recent Period and the Current State (2012 to 2015) 
3.1.4.1 Exchange Rate Policy 
As mentioned in the preceding section, in May 2012 a significant policy shift happened in the 
Malawian foreign exchange market. The Malawi Kwacha was devalued by nearly 50 percent 
from K169 to K250 per US$ and was allowed to freely float (Lungu, 2015). In the year 
preceding the devaluation and floatation, Malawi’s economy was in a bad shape. Donors had 
suspended budget support as their relationship with the country soured. As such the country 
faced one of the worst foreign exchange shortages in its history. Foreign exchange reserves 
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were so low huge arrears were accumulated in foreign exchange payments by both 
government and the private sector, estimated to be in excess of US$600 million, according to 
a press statement by RBM (2016, January 28). With the acute foreign exchange shortages, 
most foreign exchange bureaux (bureaux de change) closed down, making it difficult for the 
private sector to access forex. Critical imports such as oil were in persistent short supply. To 
support the exchange rate misallocation, exchange controls were intensified, such that access 
to foreign exchange through the formal system was extremely difficult, as stated by RBM 
(2016, January 28). Consequently, parallel markets for both forex and oil flourished. The 
economy was in such a precarious state that devaluation and floatation of the local currency 
were inevitable.  
According to an RBM Press Statement (2016, January 28), the most recent devaluation and 
the liberalisation of the foreign exchange market (including floating the Kwacha and 
loosening exchange controls) in 2012 were aimed at correcting the exchange rate 
misallocation once and for all. The RBM Press Statement (2016, January 28) stated that 
intention behind the devaluation and liberalisation was to create a long-term conducive 
environment for a more resilient, productive and exporting country. 
A floating exchange rate system and a liberalised foreign exchange market in general implies 
that the value of the local currency is allowed to be determined by market forces of demand 
and supply. The Reserve Bank or government does not dictate the value of the local currency. 
Depending on the availability of foreign exchange reserves and cost implications, however, 
the RBM intervenes in the market by selling and buying forex when demand and supply are 
temporarily mismatched. That way, the RBM can indirectly maintain stability in the foreign 
exchange rate; even though the current exchange rate system in Malawi is officially a free 
float, it is in fact a managed float. 
The liberalisation of the foreign exchange market, including the floatation of the Kwacha, had 
some positive effects on the economy. Within a period of one year after the floatation, the 
foreign exchange position greatly improved. According to the RBM Press Statement (2016, 
January 28), all outstanding external payment arrears were settled by September 2013. Fuel 
shortages also eased off.  The Reserve Bank’s net foreign exchange reserves grew from 
negative US$161.1 million in June 2012 to US$147.5 million in June 2013 and US$158 
million by end June 2015 (RBM Press Statement, 2016 January 28). Also important, with the 
loosening of most current account exchange controls and some capital account controls, the 
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economy became more integrated into regional and global markets. The economy seemed to 
be moving on the right track. 
As shown in Figure 3.3, however, since the exchange rate was floated in May 2012, the 
Malawi Kwacha has been exhibiting a volatile upward trend. After barely one year, in June 
2013, the Kwacha depreciated by a further 20 percent to US$/K330 from US$/K250 in May 
2012. It continued to depreciate to US$/K437 in June 2015, US$/K581 in November 2015 
and US$/K740 in January 2016. The Malawi Kwacha had lost value by 338 percent by 
January 2016 from US$/K169 before floatation in May 2012.  
When exchange rate policy changes, it is commonly accompanied by changes in financial 
liberalisation policy. For instance, when the exchange rate was floated in 2012 and again in 
1994, the country embraced financial liberalisation by loosening financial and exchange 
controls. When the exchange rate was pegged in the 2000s and in the period before 1994, 
tight financial and exchange controls were in place. This could indicate possible trade-offs 
between these intermediate policy goals as postulated by the trilemma hypothesis. 
It can also be observed from Figure 3.2 that, after the floatation of the currency and the 
liberalisation of the foreign exchange market in 2012, the inflation rate became volatile, rising 
significantly from 12.5 percent in April 2012 prior to the policy change, to 37.9 percent in 
February 2013. It was previously mentioned (and can be observed in Figure 3.2) that inflation 
also rose significantly and became volatile when the exchange rate was floated and the 
financial system was liberalised in 1994. The same trend was observed in 1998 when the 
exchange rate was also floated. This would suggest a strong influence of exchange rate policy 
and financial liberalisation on macroeconomic performance, especially on inflation.  
3.1.4.2 Monetary Policy 
Current Objectives of Monetary Policy in Malawi 
According to an RBM Monetary Policy Statement No.3 (2016, January 06), monetary policy 
in Malawi is currently conducted through the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) with two major 
objectives: achieving low and stable prices and financial system stability. These objectives are 
meant to promote exchange rate stability, investment, employment creation and hence 
sustainable economic growth.  
The Reserve Bank also aims at building foreign exchange reserves, as stated in RBM 
Monetary Policy Statement No.3 (2016, January 06). Foreign exchange reserves enable the 
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RBM to manage exchange rate fluctuations in order to cushion the foreign exchange market 
against shocks and ultimately anchor inflation expectations. Additionally, the RBM takes a 
long-term stand regarding the direction of the economy that is consistent with the 
government’s vision, including commitments to regional integration (RBM Monetary Policy 
Statement No.3, 2016, January 06). 
Monetary Policy Framework and Instruments 
Currently, the monetary policy stance in Malawi is guided by an inflation target. As stated by 
Simwaka & Mkandawire (2011), the inflation target is set by the National Economic 
Management Committee (NEMC) under the leadership of the Treasury. It is based on a 
thorough assessment and projection of the economic environment, including expectations of 
economic growth.  The Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development announces 
the inflation target together with projected macroeconomic framework for a particular 
financial year in a budget statement presented to Parliament. With the financial year in 
Malawi running from July to June of the following year, the RBM determines a calendar year 
inflation target from the financial year target. 
According to Simwaka (2011), the Reserve Bank further translates the calendar year inflation 
target to intermediate operating monetary measures for monetary policy based on its own 
assessment of indicators that entail price developments such as Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), Consumer Price Index (CPI), monetary growth and credit expansion. The RBM then 
issues a Monetary Policy Statement to key stakeholders and the general public on the stance 
of monetary policy consistent with the projected macroeconomic environment and the fiscal 
stance, especially the inflation target and the planned financing of any budget deficit (RBM 
Monetary Policy Statement No.3, 2016, January 06). 
The previous operating framework for monetary policy involved the Reserve Bank setting 
targets on monetary aggregates such as reserve money. Monetary policy actions would then 
be directed towards achieving the reserve money target. Beginning in January 2014, however, 
the monetary policy operating framework changed to interest rate targeting, as stated in the 
RBM Monetary Policy Statement No.3 (2016, January 06).  
In an interest rate targeting framework, the monetary authorities (monetary policy committee) 
set a Policy Rate (PR), previously called the Bank Rate, that is consistent with the inflation 
target. Changes in the Policy Rate signal the stance of monetary policy. The Policy Rate is 
meant to influence all other short-term interest rates in the money market such as the Inter-
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Bank Market rate, Treasury bill rate, Prime rate and eventually lending and deposit rates. The 
Policy Rate is made effective by using monetary policy instruments such as the Liquidity 
Reserve Requirement (LRR) and Open Market Operations (OMO). 
As mentioned previously, the Liquidity Reserve Requirement (LRR) is the proportion of a 
commercial bank clients’ deposits that the commercial bank is mandated to keep as reserves 
at the Reserve Bank. The reserves are meant to be a buffer against liquidity shortages. Any 
commercial bank’s reserves at the Reserve Bank over and above the required reserves are 
excess reserves. When excess reserves are too high it implies that the banking system is 
awash with liquidity which can potentially increase inflation; and when they are negative, it 
indicates a liquidity shortage. The Reserve Bank manages liquidity levels by changing the 
LRR or by implementing Open Market Operations (OMO).  
Open Market Operations are purchases and sales of securities such as Treasury bills, RBM 
bills, Treasury notes and Treasury bonds by the central bank to commercial banks, other 
financial institutions and non-bank institutions.  The RBM can also lend to commercial banks 
when they are experiencing a liquidity shortage by using the Lombard Facility which is 
maintained at 2.0 percentage points above the Policy Rate, according to RBM Monetary 
Policy Statement No.3 (2016, January 06). 
Activating these monetary policy instruments affects commercial banks’ reserves with the 
central bank and hence liquidity in the financial system. Liquidity in turn influences short-
term interest rates such that an increase (decrease) in the Policy Rate leads to an increase 
(decrease) in money market rates. Consequently, money market rates are kept close to the 
Policy Rate. Thus, the current monetary policy framework involves active management of 
commercial bank reserves with the central bank in order to ensure that short-term interest 
rates such as Treasury bills and Inter-Bank Market Rates are always close to the Policy Rate. 
Figure 3.4 provides evidence of the close relationship between the Policy Rate and money 
market rates. 
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Data Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) 
 
The RBM Monetary Policy Statement No.3 (2016, January 06) states that the Reserve Bank 
of Malawi also observes the position of Net Foreign Assets (NFA) and Net Domestic Assets 
(NDA) as per the requirement of the IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF) Program. Net 
Foreign Assets (NFA) are the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves plus any other assets it 
may own outside the country less any domestic assets held by foreigners with the central 
bank. Net Domestic Assets (NDA) comprise of central bank’s loans to commercial banks (and 
other financial institutions) and to central government. Usually, as stated in the RBM 
Monetary Policy Statement No.3 (2016, January 06), the Reserve Bank, guided by the 
provisions of the ECF program, puts a ceiling on NDA and a floor on NFA. Open Market 
Operations and purchases and sales of foreign exchange are then used to manage levels of 
NDA and NFA, respectively, which in turn affect reserve money (sum of commercial bank 
deposits with the Reserve Bank and currency in circulation) and ultimately the money supply.  
According to the RBM Monetary Policy Statement No.3 (2016, January 06), the Reserve 
Bank also recently started to use communication as a strategy for increasing the effectiveness 
of monetary policy. The Reserve Bank issues a Monetary Policy Statement to stakeholders 
and the general public after the monetary policy stance is decided. The Bank also periodically 
publishes minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee on its website. 
In brief summary, the Reserve Bank currently uses a variety of instruments for monetary 
policy including the Policy Rate (PR), the Lombard Rate (LR), Liquidity Reserve 
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Requirement (LRR), Open market Operations (OMO), sales and purchases of foreign 
exchange and communication. The focus of monetary policy is now on interest rate targeting 
where as previously it was on reserve money targeting. Nevertheless, Ngalawa & Viegi 
(2011) argue that even in periods where the official framework for monetary policy was 
monetary targeting, the Bank Rate was a more effective tool of monetary policy than reserve 
money in Malawi. 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, monetary policy independence and central bank credibility go 
hand-in-hand insofar as affecting macroeconomic stability is concerned. If the central bank is 
influenced by the government, it could use monetary policy as a tool for financing fiscal 
deficits; a lack of independence will reduce credibility and, in turn mean that announcements 
regarding inflation targets and the like will not be believed. According to the World Bank 
Report (2015, October 19), weak fiscal discipline is a major contributor to Malawi’s 
macroeconomic instability and the prospects for improvement remain poor. The World Bank 
Report (2015, October 19) reported that the Malawi government has been running large fiscal 
deficits due to expenditure pressure emanating from rising cost of servicing debt, the need to 
settle outstanding arrears, ever increasing wage demands and high cost of agricultural subsidy 
schemes. Besides, with the country’s heavy reliance on foreign aid, any shocks to donor 
budget support forces the government to continue borrowing heavily from domestic sources 
in order to finance budget deficits. Heavy government borrowing crowds out private sector 
investment and pushes up lending rates and inflation, thereby constraining economic growth; 
empirically assessing the effect of monetary policy independence on economic performance is 
relevant in Malawi. 
 
3.2 Overview of Malawi’s Economy and Financial System 
3.2.1 Country Overview 
Malawi (officially known as the Republic of Malawi) is a small landlocked country in Sub-
Saharan Africa. It covers an area of over 118 000km2, approximately one third of which is 
Lake Malawi.  It is bordered by Tanzania to the northeast, Zambia to the northwest and 
Mozambique to the east, south and west. As at the end of 2014, the population was estimated 
at 16.8 million (World Bank, 2016). It is thus one of the most densely populated countries in 
Africa. 
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3.2.2 Overview of Malawi’s Economy 
Over the past few decades, as mentioned in preceding sections, Malawi has made various 
economic and structural reforms aimed at promoting economic growth. Although the country 
has managed to maintain its economic growth rates, it is still one of the least-developed 
countries in the world. Poverty and income inequality are still very high. The World Bank 
(2016) estimates that about 85 percent of the country’s population live in rural areas.  
Malawi’s economy is undiversified and largely agro-based which makes it vulnerable to 
climate or weather changes. The 85 percent of the population who live in the rural areas 
mostly depend on subsistence agriculture. Also, as indicated in Mangani (2011), about one 
third of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 90 percent of its export revenue 
come from the agriculture sector. Other important sectors, according to Mangani (2011), 
include the services sector (dominated by wholesale and retail trade) which contributes 
between 45 to 50 percent of GDP and the manufacturing sector (dominated by agro-
processing) which contributes about 10 percent to GDP. 
The country’s main exports include tobacco, tea and cane sugar and its main imports are oil, 
farm inputs (such as fertiliser) and wholesale and retail products. This makes the country 
vulnerable to external shocks such as oil and fertiliser prices. With imports exceeding exports, 
a perpetual current account deficit is faced. Additionally, being a landlocked country, 
importing and exporting is time consuming and relatively costly. The average tariff rate for 
the country is 3.8 percent, according to the World Bank (2008). Also, as a small economy, 
most of the country’s international transactions are done in foreign currencies, making it 
vulnerable to volatility in foreign currencies. 
Further, Malawi is still facing challenges to build and expand the economy and hence become 
financially independent. It is also having difficulties with improving the education system, 
providing adequate health care and protecting the environment. The Malawi government still 
depends heavily on foreign aid and loans from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), African Development Bank (ADB), the United States Government, the European 
Union, the United Kingdom and other partners for development projects, even though this 
need has subsided in recent years. This makes the economy vulnerable to shocks in capital 
flows in form of aid such that when donors suspend aid, the country faces large fiscal deficits 
which end up crowding out private sector investment. 
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In addition, despite macroeconomic policies that are directed towards promoting private 
sector investment, the country still has a relatively weak private sector. While privatisation 
has been progressing, state-owned enterprises still operate in some sectors of the economy. 
Mangani (2011) indicates that the private sector usually contributes approximately only 20 
percent of total annual investment for the country.  
In terms of growth in recent years, the Malawi Government Budget Statement for the 
2016/2017 fiscal year indicates that the country registered real growth rates of 6.2 percent in 
2014 and 3.1 percent in 2015, compared to the average growth rates in Sub-Saharan Africa of 
5.4 percent in 2014 and 5.5 percent in 2015. Annual average inflation was at 21.8 percent in 
2015 and 23.8 percent in 2014. Macroeconomic instability is one of the greatest challenges 
that the country has been facing for a long time and is one of the factors impeding 
development of the private sector. 
Malawi participates in a number of international organisations including the United Nations, 
Commonwealth of Nations, Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
3.2.3 Financial System Overview 
Malawi’s financial system is small even when compared to other countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. It has basic financial institutions including 11 banks, 11 insurance companies and 71 
microfinance institutions - 25 deposit-taking and 46 non-deposit taking - according to the IMF 
(2015, December). On average the financial sector contributes slightly above 50 percent to the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It registered 51 percent in both 2013 and 2014. 
Banks dominate the financial system, accounting for more than 60 percent of total assets in 
the financial sector. As indicated in Table 3.1 below, banks accounted for 61 percent and 64 
percent of total financial sector assets in 2014 and 2013, respectively. The banks also 
collectively accounted for 95 percent of the economy’s credit as at end-2014 and 97 percent 
as at end-2013 as shown in Table 3.2. However, the banks’ credit extensions are mostly short 
to medium term and concentrated among few large borrowers in a narrow range of economic 
activities. According to IMF (2015, December), as at the end of 2014, more than 60 percent of 
total bank loans were made to the wholesale and retail industry, agricultural sector and 
manufacturing industry. Also, six of the eleven banks had more than 25 percent of their total 
credit exposures to their first largest single borrower; and four banks also had their second 
largest borrower with a credit exposure of more than the regulatory norm of 25 percent, as 
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indicated by the IMF (2015, December). Two largest banks accounted for more than half of 
total bank capitalisation, assets and deposits as at end-2014. 
The government is a significant player in the banking system. As at end-2014, the government 
held around 20 percent of banks outstanding credits and 3.5 percent of total banking system 
deposits. The banks had 24 percent of their total assets invested in government securities, 
according to IMF (2015, December). This exposes the banks to fiscal developments. 
Insurance companies are divided into three categories, namely, general insurance, life 
insurance and re-insurance companies. Four Life insurance companies dominate the sector, 
accounting for about 89 percent of total assets for the insurance sector.  Pension funds have 
increased in recent years, following the country’s adoption of a new Pensions Act in 2011. 
The IMF (2015, December) indicates that as at end-2014 there were 1,500 pension funds 
mostly operated by four pension administrators and 13 stand-alone pension funds. Total assets 
for the pension funds, as indicated by IMF (2015, December) accounted for 10 percent of 
GDP (K259 billion) in 2015 which were invested in equities, government securities, fixed 
deposits and properties. 
The microfinance sector is small but growing. It is divided into financial cooperatives and 
non-deposit taking institutions. The sector accounted for about 18 percent of total assets of the 
financial sector and 5 percent of total financial sector credit to the economy as at end-2014 as 
shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.1. Total Assets for Malawi's Financial Institutions 
  2013 2014 
Billion 
Kwacha 
Percent 
of Total 
Billion 
Kwacha 
Percent 
of Total 
Banks 653 64% 796,1 61% 
General Insurance 18,9 2% 25,1 2% 
Life Insurance 170,5 17% 223,3 17% 
Pension Funds 170,8 17% 247 19% 
Micro-Finance Institutions 
(MFIs) 11,6 1% 17,8 1% 
Total 1024,8 100% 1309,3 100% 
Percent of GDP 51% 
 
51%   
Source: International Monetary Fund 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
 
Table 3.2. Financial Sector Credits to the Economy 
  
2013 2014 
Billion 
Kwacha 
Percent 
of Total 
Billion 
Kwacha 
Percent 
of Total 
Credit from banks 256,6 97% 304,9 95% 
Credit from non-deposit taking MFIs 5,5 2% 12,6 4% 
Credit from deposit taking MFIs 2,7 1% 3,2 1% 
Total credit to the economy 264,8 100% 320,7 100% 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
 
 
Lastly, the capital market (the Malawi Stock Exchange (MSE)) is nascent and undergoing 
development6. It has a few listed companies, a limited variety of trading instruments and low 
retail investor participation. Currently only 14 companies are listed on the exchange with total 
market capitalisation at K7, 473.31 billion (US$10.95 billion) as at end March 2016 (RBM, 
2016, March). Although the number of listed companies has not changed in a while, market 
capitalisation has been increasing in recent years. As shown in Table 3.3, the MSE market 
capitalisation closed at K7,489.36 billion in 2014, K7,179.93 billion in 2013, K3,562.2 billion 
in 2012 and K2,681.0 billion in 2011. Besides, the Malawi government recently (in 2014) 
listed three government bonds for the first time on the stock exchange in a bid to build the 
yield curve. No corporate bonds have been listed yet. The MSE currently faces two major 
risks: low liquidity and consumer confidence. 
Table 3.3. Malawi Stock Exchange Statistics 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 
Market capitalization (billion Kwacha) 2681 3562,2 7179,93 7489,36 
Market capitalisation as a percent of GDP  214 237,2 357 291,4 
Volume of shares traded (billion)  1,6 0,67 4,41 1,72 
Value of shares traded (billion Kwacha) 6,9 3,97 13,33 10,87 
  
   
  
Malawi All Share Index (MASI) 5369,4 6015,5 12531,04 14,886,12 
Domestic Share Index (DSI) 4238,4 4725,5 9850,19 11720,43 
Foreign Share Index (FSI) 535,4 854,7 1709,34 1759,61 
(Percentage Change) 
Malawi All Share Index (MASI) 8,4 12 108,3 18,8 
Domestic Share Index (DSI) 8,1 11,5 108,4 19 
Foreign Share Index (FSI) 52,1 59,6 100 2,9 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
                                                          
6 The Malawi Stock Exchange was established in 1996 and started equity trading in November, 1996. 
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The shallowness and lack of diversity of Malawi’s economy, as well as financial system 
constraints, challenge macroeconomic policy making. The three policies, monetary policy, 
exchange rate policy and financial integration, are mostly inefficient and costly to implement 
in this kind of environment. This could explain why the macroeconomic policy framework for 
Malawi has changed frequently over the years as authorities try out different policy 
combinations depending on the country’s needs at specific times. This reinforces the point 
that an empirical examination of the trilemma trade-offs and effects in Malawi is vital; results 
of panel studies that have dominated the existing empirical literature may not be true for 
individual countries. 
3.3 Summary and Conclusion 
The macroeconomic policy framework for Malawi has changed a great deal since the country 
gained independence in 1964. Monetary policy has evolved from the use of direct tools such 
as direct controls on interest rates and credit by the government, to indirect ones; first with the 
adoption of reserve money targeting framework and later with the adoption of interest rate 
targeting framework in an inflation target context. 
Exchange Rate Policy has also gone through a series of reforms, starting with a fixed 
exchange rate system when the country just gained independence, to adoption of a floating 
exchange rate regime in 1994, a managed floating rate regime in 1995, a crawling peg in 
1997, a free float in 1998, a fixed rate with some adjustments in 2003, and eventually to a free 
floating rate again in 2012. 
Financial integration has also been progressing as the country opens up to international 
markets. The country has moved from a heavily controlled financial system during early years 
of independence to one that is more liberalised with less onerous exchange and financial 
controls and an almost completely liberalised foreign exchange market. 
Despite all the macroeconomic policy reforms Malawi has gone through, however, 
macroeconomic instability has been a big challenge for the country. Inflation, output and 
exchange rates, especially, have been volatile. Several factors could have contributed to this 
macroeconomic instability, including the country’s dependence on often volatile foreign aid, 
an undiversified economy, a weak private sector and an underdeveloped financial system. 
Besides these factors, the country’s pursuit of independent monetary policy, exchange rate 
stability and financial integration could also have contributed a great deal to this 
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macroeconomic instability. The Trilemma hypothesis of International Finance and 
Macroeconomic Policy (or the Impossible Trinity) posits that these three intermediate policy 
goals cannot be pursued simultaneously due to trade-offs among them. This is why this study 
empirically examines the trade-offs between the three intermediate policy goals in Malawi 
and analyses their impact on macroeconomic performance in terms of levels and volatility of 
inflation and output growth over the last three decades. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
As a starting point, it is important to reiterate the goals of the study. It was mentioned 
previously that the study aims to achieve the following three goals: 
1. to empirically evaluate trade-offs between monetary policy independence, exchange 
rate stability and financial integration and hence find out if the macroeconomic policy 
trilemma is a binding constraint in Malawi;  
2. to determine the combination of the intermediate policy goals of the trilemma that has 
been dominant or prevalent in the country in the last three decades;  
3. to assess the extent to which pursuing the trilemma intermediate policy goals has 
affected macroeconomic performance in Malawi, in terms of the level and volatility of 
inflation and output growth in the last three decades.  
This fourth chapter describes in detail the methodology employed to achieve the three goals. 
The study takes a positivist quantitative approach and adopts an existing methodology in the 
literature that was introduced by Aizenman et al. (2008) using multiple countries. The 
methodology was also used in other multi-country studies by Aizenman et al. (2009; 2010; 
2011; 2012), and in single-country studies by Hsing (2012a; 2012b; 2013a; 2013b), Hutchison 
et al. (2012), Jian et al. (2011) and Sengupta (2015), among others. The use of an existing 
methodology in literature would make results of this study comparable with those of other 
studies that applied the same methodology to other countries. 
Briefly, the approach involves, first, constructing indices that measure Malawi’s level of 
achievement in each of the three intermediate policy goals of the trilemma. Second, the 
trilemma is tested by estimating a linear model where a constant (one) is regressed on the 
three constructed indices using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. Third, the most 
prevalent combination of the trilemma intermediate policy goals over the study period is 
determined by analyzing the means and graphs of predicted values of the indices from the 
trilemma equation. Lastly, linear regressions are estimated using the OLS method to assess 
the impact of the trilemma intermediate policy goals on the level and volatility of inflation 
and output growth. Each of these steps is described in greater detail in subsequent sections.  
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4.1 Construction of Measures for the Intermediate Policy Goals of the Trilemma 
Empirical analysis of the validity of the macroeconomic policy trilemma is a difficult task and 
still a work in progress. The difficulty arises from a number of reasons, one being the fact that 
there are no direct measures for monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and 
financial integration. Most of the literature agree on the proxy measures for monetary policy 
independence and exchange rate stability but often vary on the measure for financial 
integration. This study adopts formulae developed by Aizenman et al. (2008) to construct 
indices for monetary policy independence and exchange rate stability. The measure for 
financial integration is constructed using a formula that was used by Jian et al. (2011). 
4.1.1 Measure for Monetary Policy Independence (MI) 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, money market interest rates, especially the Policy Rate, have 
always indicated the stance of monetary policy in Malawi. There have been episodes of 
interest rate targeting as the official monetary policy framework. In other episodes such as 
reserve money targeting framework, where interest rates are not the main policy instrument, 
changes in monetary policy have always directly affected interest rates. Moreover, as pointed 
out in Chapter 3, Ngalawa & Viegi (2011) established that even during the reserve money 
targeting framework, interest rates were a more effective tool of monetary policy than reserve 
money. It would make sense, therefore, to measure the degree of monetary policy 
independence in Malawi as the extent to which interest rates in Malawi follow interest rates in 
the base country. In other words, the measure for monetary policy independence is based on 
correlations between Malawian interest rates and the base country’s (South Africa7) interest 
rates. 
The correlations are then normalized to yield an index whose values lie between zero and one. 
Normalization makes the monetary policy independence index (MI) comparable with the 
indices for exchange rate stability and financial integration.  
The monetary policy independence index (MI) was developed by Aizenman et al. (2008) and 
was later used by Aizenman et al. (2010; 2011; 2012), Hutchison et al. (2012) and Jian et al. 
(2011), among others. It is defined as follows: 
𝑀𝐼 = 1 − (
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖, 𝑗) − (−1)
1 − (−1)
) 
                                                          
7 South Africa is chosen as the base country because Malawi’s monetary policy framework is more likely to 
follow South Africa’s framework. Besides, similar studies such as Aizenman et al (2008) used South Africa as a 
base country for Malawi. 
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Where i stands for the interest rate variable for Malawi and j stands for the interest rate 
variable for the base country, South Africa, so that Corr(i,j) is the correlation between the 
Malawian interest rate and the South African interest rate.  
Following Aizenman et al. (2011) and Algu & Creamer (2016), the index is smoothed by 
taking the average of the value of the index in current period (t), the preceding period (t-1) 
and the following period (t+1). Smoothing the index makes the trend more defined. 
Higher values of the index indicate greater monetary policy independence and lower values 
indicate lower monetary policy independence.  
Monthly nominal 90-days Treasury bill rates are used. The choice to use Treasury bill rates is 
based on the fact that they are defined in the same way in both Malawi and South Africa. The 
Policy Rate, being an official and a better indicator of the stance of monetary policy, would be 
preferred to the Treasury bill rate but the former is defined differently and used for different 
purposes in Malawi and South Africa. As mentioned in Chapter 3 and depicted in Figure 3.4, 
however, there is a close relationship in movements of the Policy Rate and the Treasury bill 
rate such that a change in the Policy Rate is almost instantaneously followed by a similar 
change in the Treasury bill rate. The Treasury bill rate would thus effectively measure the 
stance of monetary policy. Hutchison et al. (2012) also used Treasury bill rates in a single 
country study for India. Aizenman et al. (2008), and Shambaugh (2004) used Treasury bill 
rates for some countries and money market rates for other countries in panel studies.   
Nominal rates are used because of the fact that the central bank uses nominal interest rates, 
not real rates, to indicate the stance of monetary policy, as Obstfeld et al. (2005) pointed out. 
Also, the argument of the trilemma hypothesis, as discussed in Chapter 2, applies to nominal 
interest rates, not real rates. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the monetary policy independence index for the study period (1983 to 
2014). This index is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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4.1.2 Measure for Exchange Rate Stability (ERS) 
The measure for the degree of exchange rate stability is also adopted from Aizenman et al. 
(2008). It is represented by the volatility of the exchange rate between the local currency and 
the base country’s currency. Exchange rate volatility is measured as the annual standard 
deviation of the monthly rate of depreciation of the Malawi Kwacha relative to the United 
States Dollar.  The exchange rate volatility variable is normalized to make its values lie 
between zero and one so that the index is comparable with the monetary policy independence 
and the financial integration indices. The exchange rate stability index (ERS) is, thus, 
computed as follows: 
𝐸𝑅𝑆 =
0.01
0.01 + 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣(∆(log(𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)))
 
Where 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣(∆(log(𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒))) is the exchange rate volatility variable. Higher values 
of the index indicate higher levels of exchange rate stability and lower values indicate lower 
stability.  
The United States Dollar is chosen as the base currency since in most episodes of fixed 
exchange rates the Malawi Kwacha was pegged to the United States Dollar. Additionally, 
most of Malawi’s international transactions are quoted in US$.  
Nominal exchange rates are used for the same reason mentioned previously, namely that the 
trilemma hypothesis applies primarily to nominal variables.  As with the monetary policy 
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Figure 4.1 Monetary Policy Independence Index
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independence index, the exchange rate stability index is smoothed to make the trend more 
defined. 
Figure 4.2 plots the exchange rate stability index (ERS) for the period under review. This 
index is also discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
 
 
4.1.3 Measure for Financial Integration (FI) 
Most authors agree on the measures for monetary policy independence and exchange rate 
stability but differ on the measure for financial integration or capital account openness. This is 
because the degree of financial integration is quite difficult to measure.  
There are two types of measures for financial integration in literature: de jure and de facto 
measures. According to Obstfeld et al. (2005), de jure measures are based on a country’s 
formal / legal commitments to financial integration. They are based on policies or controls on 
capital flows deliberately adopted by countries. One such measure is the KAOPEN that was 
developed by Chinn and Ito (2007). It is based on country information regarding restrictions 
on international flows reported in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Rate Restriction (AREAER) of the International Monetary Fund. 
De jure measures for financial integration have mostly been used in multi-country studies 
relating to the trilemma concept, such as Aizenman et al. (2008; 2010). Their use in multi-
country studies emanates from the fact that they are convenient for making comparisons 
regarding the level of financial integration between countries since they are based on standard 
information.  
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De jure measures, however, have a number of shortcomings. Jian et al. (2011), argue that they 
do not accurately reflect the level of a country’s capital account openness since they are 
partially based on restrictions on foreign exchange flows which may not necessarily impede 
capital flows. Jian et al. (2011), further argue that de jure measures do not reflect the 
effectiveness of enforcement efforts of capital controls. This is due to the fact that de jure 
measures do not change when controls do not change on paper even though enforcement 
efforts do change over time. Additionally, Jian et al. (2011) also argue that some countries 
may have strict controls but may not be effective in enforcing them. Lastly, according to Kose 
et al. (2006), because de jure measures are standardized, they may fail to include some capital 
controls that are actually effective in some countries. Thus, the main shortcoming of de jure 
measures is that they may fail to fully reflect what actually happens in reality compared to 
what is on paper. 
De facto measures on the other hand are based on observed behaviour of capital flows. As 
suggested by Kose et al. (2006), they tend to reflect reality in terms of a country’s level of 
financial integration better than de jure measures. Besides, Jian et al. (2011) and Kose et al. 
(2006) note that they take into account not only policy restrictions but also effectiveness and 
changes in enforcement efforts of the restrictions. Chen (2006 in Jian et al., 2011), however, 
argues that de facto measures are prone to measurement errors since they may be influenced 
by other macroeconomic factors such as interest rate spreads, expectations on exchange rate 
changes and a country’s economic growth potential, among other factors. 
Despite the shortcomings, this study uses a de facto measure of financial integration. The 
choice is mainly based on the ability of de facto measures to closely capture what is actually 
on the ground relative to de jure measures. A de jure measure may not accurately reflect how 
the level of financial integration has changed in Malawi over the years due to the fact that the 
country has had issues with effectiveness and enforcement of some restrictions such as 
declaration of export proceeds. A de facto measure for financial integration also allows for 
uniformity since the measures for both monetary policy independence and exchange rate 
stability used in the study are de facto. Moreover, this is a single country study and so using a 
de jure measure may not be necessary since comparing the level of financial integration in 
Malawi with other countries may not be important. 
There are various de facto measures of financial integration in literature. Hutchison et al. 
(2012) and Globan (2014) measured capital account openness as the ratio of the sum of actual 
gross investment inflows and outflows to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Chen (2006 in Jian 
et al., 2011) and Hutchison et al. (2012), however, point out that this measure is prone to 
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measurement errors since investment flows may be influenced by other macroeconomic 
factors, and not necessarily by market openness. 
Another de facto measure of financial integration is the ratio of the sum of gross stocks of 
foreign assets and liabilities to GDP. This measure was introduced by Kose et al. (2006) and 
was also used by Jian et al. (2011). It is a modified version of the preceding measure and is 
believed to mitigate the measurement errors. For this reason, this study adopts this measure. 
The financial integration index (FI) used in this study is thus defined as the ratio of the sum of 
Malawi’s gross stock of foreign assets (FA) and gross stock of foreign liabilities (FL) to gross 
domestic product (GDP) as follows: 
𝐹𝐼 =
𝐹𝐴 + 𝐹𝐿
𝐺𝐷𝑃
 
Like the measures for monetary policy independence and exchange rate stability, the financial 
integration measure is normalised to produce an index whose values lie between zero and one. 
The formula for normalisation is defined as follows:  
𝑋𝑖,   0 𝑡𝑜 1 =
𝑋𝑖 − 𝑋𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑋𝑀𝑎𝑥 − 𝑋𝑀𝑖𝑛
 
Where: 
Xi = each data point i 
XMin = minimum value among all the data points 
XMax = maximum value among all the data points 
Xi, 0 to 1 = data point i normalized between 0 and 1 
Higher values of the index indicate greater financial integration and lower values indicate 
lower levels of financial integration. 
Like the other two indices, the financial integration index is smoothed by taking the average 
of the value of the index in current period (t), the preceding period (t-1) and the following 
period (t+1). 
Figure 4.3 depicts the constructed financial integration index. Again, the index is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 5. 
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4.2 Testing if the Trilemma is binding in Malawi 
Previously it was mentioned that one of the reasons the macroeconomic policy trilemma is 
difficult to test empirically lies in the difficulty in measuring a country’s level of achievement 
in each of its components. Aizenman & Ito (2011), add that the difficulty in empirically 
testing the validity of the trilemma is also due to the fact that the hypothesis does not 
explicitly impose a functional form for the associations between the three intermediate policy 
goals.  
To assess if the trilemma is binding in Malawi, that is, to evaluate the tradeoffs between the 
trilemma intermediate policy goals, the study adopts Aizenman et al. (2008) approach. Using 
OLS, a linear model is estimated by regressing a constant (one) on the constructed indices for 
monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration.  According to 
Hutchison et al. (2012), the rationale for estimating this linear model is that if there are indeed 
trade-offs between the trilemma intermediate policy goals, the weighted sum of the three 
constructed indices should equal a constant (one in this study) since there is an overall 
constraint on the indices . This is to say, if Malawi faced the trilemma over the study period, 
increasing one trilemma variable should have induced a balanced decrease in one or the 
weighted sum of the other two variables.  
The trilemma equation is thus expressed as:  
1 = 𝛽1𝑀𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝑡 
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Figure 4.3 Financial Integration Index (FI) 
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Where: 
𝑀𝐼𝑡, 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 and 𝐹𝐼𝑡 are the monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and 
financial integration indices, respectively, at a point in time. 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 represent the 
weights assigned to each of the three intermediate policy goals. 
The regression that is estimated is, therefore, defined as follows: 
1 = ?̂?1𝑀𝐼𝑡 + ?̂?2𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 + ?̂?3𝐹𝐼𝑡 +  𝜀?̂? 
Where: 
?̂?1, ?̂?2 and ?̂?3 are estimates of the weights 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 assigned to monetary policy 
independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration, respectively, over the sample 
period. 𝜀?̂?  is an error term representing the proportion of the three variables that was not fully 
utilised or to what extent the trilemma was not binding at a point in time. 
Following Aizenman et al. (2008), assessing if the trilemma is binding involves, first of all, 
examining the explanatory power or the goodness of fit of the estimated regression. If the 
goodness of fit (R2) is high enough, it would mean that the trilemma is binding, implying that 
there are trade-offs between the three intermediate policy goals in Malawi. If the goodness of 
fit is low, it would mean that either the trilemma is not applicable to Malawi or the association 
between the three intermediate policy goals is not linear.  
Secondly, the assessment involves analyzing the coefficients in the estimated regression. For 
the trilemma constraints to be binding, according to Aizenman et al. (2012), all the 
coefficients of the estimated regression should be significant and positive since it is proposed 
that the weighted sum of the indices equals a constant. The coefficients also provide 
approximate estimates of the weights assigned to each intermediate policy goal. 
Lastly, the assessment also involves analyzing contributions of each of the indices to the total 
(one). The contributions indicate the proportion of each of the policy variables that was 
actually implemented. They are obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficients with 
corresponding values of the indices as follows: 
𝑀?̂?𝑡 =  ?̂?1 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝑡 
𝐸𝑅?̂?𝑡 =  ?̂?2 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 
𝐹?̂?𝑡 =  ?̂?3 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑡 
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Where 𝑀?̂?𝑡, 𝐸𝑅?̂?𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹?̂?𝑡 are the contributions for monetary policy independence (𝑀𝐼𝑡), 
exchange rate stability (𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡) and financial integration (𝐹𝐼𝑡), respectively, at a point in time. 
?̂?1, ?̂?2and ?̂?3 are as defined previously. 
According to Aizenman et al. (2008) and Hutchison et al. (2012), analysing the sum of these 
contributions over the sample period should provide inferences about how binding the 
trilemma is. They propose that if the trilemma is binding, the sum of the contributions (i.e. the 
predicted values) should hover around a constant (one in this study). That is, the following 
should hold: 
𝑀?̂?𝑡 +  𝐸𝑅?̂?𝑡 + 𝐹?̂?𝑡 ≈ 1  
The mean of the predicted values (the sum of the contributions) is also assessed to determine 
if it equals unity, as the trilemma postulates. 
Correlations between individual contributions of the three indices to the total are also 
computed to further analyse the trade-offs between the trilemma intermediate policy goals. 
4.3 Determining the Dominant Combination in the Last Three Decades 
The second goal of the study is to determine the combination of the trilemma intermediate 
policy goals that has been prevalent in Malawi in the last three decades. First of all, following 
Aizenman et al. (2008), examining the coefficients ?̂?1, ?̂?2and ?̂?3  of the estimated regression 
should provide some inference regarding which of the three intermediate policy goals 
received priority over the other two. The higher the value of the coefficient, the more weight 
its corresponding policy variable was given on average during the review period. Aizenman et 
al. (2008), however, point out that the coefficients alone would not be enough to determine 
the prioritised policy goal. They argue that the contributions 𝑀?̂?𝑡, 𝐸𝑅?̂?𝑡 and 𝐹?̂?𝑡  would be 
more informative. The intermediate policy goal with the highest mean contribution would be 
the most pursued goal over the sample period. 
Second, as earlier mentioned, the impossible trinity theory predicts that a country faced by the 
constraints of the trilemma would have to choose two of the three intermediate policy goals at 
a particular point in time (Globan, 2014; Jian et al., 2011). This means that the country would 
have the following three possible policy combinations to choose from: monetary policy 
independence and exchange rate stability; monetary policy independence and financial 
integration; and exchange rate stability and financial integration. To determine which of the 
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three policy combinations was dominant in Malawi over the study period, therefore, the three 
possible policy combinations are constructed using the individual contributions as follows: 
𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑅𝑆̂ 𝑡 =  𝑀?̂?𝑡 +  𝐸𝑅?̂?𝑡 
𝑀𝐼𝐹?̂?𝑡 = 𝑀?̂?𝑡 + 𝐹?̂?𝑡  
𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐹𝐼̂ 𝑡 = 𝐸𝑅?̂?𝑡 + 𝐹?̂?𝑡 
Where 𝑀?̂?𝑡, 𝐸𝑅?̂?𝑡 and 𝐹?̂?𝑡 are, as defined in the preceding section, contributions of monetary 
policy independence, exchange rates stability and financial integration, respectively, to the 
total (one) at a point in time. 
The three cumulative contribution variables 𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑅𝑆̂ 𝑡, 𝑀𝐼𝐹?̂?𝑡 and 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐹𝐼̂ 𝑡, are then analysed, 
beginning with a comparison of their means. The cumulative variable with the highest mean 
indicates the dominant combination of the trilemma intermediate policy goals, on average, 
over the review period.  
The cumulative variables are then plotted on a graph for a more comprehensive analysis. The 
graph with the highest point at a particular time indicates the dominant combination at that 
time. The graph will also indicate if the dominant combination changed over time. 
Aizenman et al. (2008; 2010; 2012) and Hutchison et al. (2012), divided their samples into 
two or more sub-samples to analyse the evolution of the trilemma configuration over time. 
This study does not divide the sample into sub-samples because the sample size is already 
small due to limited availability of data. The evolution of the trilemma configuration in 
Malawi is determined by using graphical analysis only. 
4.4 Examining the Impact of the Trilemma Intermediate Policy Goals on 
Macroeconomic Performance 
The last goal of the study relates to how pursuing each of the trilemma intermediate policy 
goals in Malawi affected the country’s macroeconomic performance over the study period, 
specifically with regards to output growth rate and the level and volatility of inflation. In 
addressing this goal three linear regressions are estimated using the OLS method. The 
regressions are defined as follows:  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝑀𝐼𝑡 + 𝜆2𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 + 𝜆3𝐹𝐼𝑡 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=4
+ 𝜔𝑡 
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𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝐼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=4
+ 𝜇𝑡 
𝐼𝑉𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑀𝐼𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐹𝐼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑍𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=4
+ 𝜐𝑡 
The regressions that are fitted are, therefore, the follows:  
?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑀𝐼𝑡 + ?̂?2𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 + ?̂?3𝐹𝐼𝑡 + ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=4
+ ?̂?𝑡 
𝐼?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑀𝐼𝑡 + ?̂?2𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 + ?̂?3𝐹𝐼𝑡 + ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=4
+  ?̂?𝑡 
𝐼?̂?𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑀𝐼𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐹𝐼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑍𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=4
+  ?̂?𝑡 
 
Where 𝑌, 𝐼𝑅, and 𝐼𝑉 stand for output growth rate, inflation rate, and inflation volatility 
variables, respectively; ?̂?,  𝐼?̂? and 𝐼?̂? are their estimated values. 𝑀𝐼, 𝐸𝑅𝑆 and 𝐹𝐼 are, as 
defined previously, the trilemma indices. 𝐺𝑖 , 𝑄𝑖  and  𝑍𝑖 , i = 4 to n, are control variables 
which include lags of the dependent variables and other variables such as international 
reserves. 𝜆𝑖, 𝛼𝑖 and  𝛿𝑖 , i = 0 to n , are coefficients; ?̂?𝑖, ?̂?𝑖, and 𝛿𝑖 , i = 0 to n, are their 
estimated values, respectively. 𝜔𝑡, 𝜇𝑡, and 𝜐𝑡  are error terms and ?̂?𝑡, ?̂?𝑡 and 𝜐𝑡   are their 
estimates.  
Significant coefficients of the trilemma indices in the fitted models estimate the effects of the 
trilemma intermediate policy goals on the macroeconomic performance indicators. 
The output growth rate is represented by the annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), Inflation is represented by the annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Inflation 
volatility is measured by the annual standard deviation of the monthly inflation rate. 
Since the trilemma indices are smoothed, for uniformity purposes all other variables, 
including the macroeconomic performance indicators, are also smoothed. 
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4.5 Unit Root and Diagnostic Tests 
The OLS method which is used to analyze economic relationships between variables is based 
on some assumptions. The most important ones are that the variables used in the regression 
are stationary, there is no multicollinearity in the explanatory variables and that the error 
terms of the regression are free from serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. To ensure that 
the findings of the study are reliable, therefore, all the variables, including the constructed 
trilemma indices, are tested for stationarity (or unit root) before being used in the regressions. 
The Augmented Dickey Fuller test is used in this regard. 
The estimated models are tested for serial correlation using the Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test. Heteroskedasticity is tested using the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test and 
multicollinearity is tested using Variance Inflation Factors. 
Results for all these tests are presented in the next chapter. Where there are problems, 
appropriate measures, such as using robust standard errors, are taken to correct them. 
4.6 Data Sources and Analysis Tools 
The study uses monthly data spanning from January 1983 to December 2014 to construct the 
annual trilemma indices. Output growth rate and inflation rate are annual variables. Annual 
Inflation volatility is computed from monthly inflation figures. 
The data are obtained from the Reserve Bank of Malawi, the Malawi National Statistics 
Office, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank.  
Eviews and Excel are used for econometric analysis and mathematical computations. 
4.7 Summary and Conclusion 
The study adopts an existing methodology in literature that was developed by Aizenman et al. 
(2008). The methodology involves, first, constructing indices that measure Malawi’s level of 
achievement in each of the trilemma intermediate policy goals: monetary policy 
independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration.  
Second, to assess if Malawi has been facing the trade-offs implied by the trilemma, a linear 
model is estimated using the Least Squares method. A constant (one) is regressed against the 
three constructed indices. 
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Third, to determine the combination of the trilemma intermediate policy goals that was 
dominant over the study period, individual contributions of the trilemma indices to the total 
(one) from the trilemma regression are used to construct three cumulative contribution 
variables of possible combinations of the intermediate policy goals. The cumulative variables 
are then plotted on a graph to determine which combination was dominant over the study 
period. The means of the cumulative variables are also analysed to determine which 
combination had the highest mean.  
Lastly, to evaluate how the trilemma intermediate policy goals affected macroeconomic 
performance during the study period, three linear regressions are estimated using the Ordinary 
Least Squares method. Macroeconomic performance indicators (output growth rate, inflation 
and inflation volatility) are regressed on the constructed trilemma indices and some control 
variables. 
Results for the estimated regressions are presented and discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the findings of the study following the procedure 
described in Chapter 4. It starts by describing some preliminary observations in the 
constructed indices for monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial 
integration. It then moves on to discuss empirical results relating to the validity of the 
trilemma in Malawi. Another section follows to discuss what the data reveals about the 
combination of the trilemma intermediate policy goals that was dominant over the study 
period. The last main section discusses the results relating to the impact of the trilemma 
intermediate policy goals on macroeconomic performance indicators. Unit root test results for 
the variables used and diagnostic tests of the estimated regressions are also presented.  
5.1 Preliminary Observations in the Constructed Trilemma Indices 
Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 in the preceding chapter depict the trilemma indices that have been 
constructed using the procedure described in section 4.1. This section presents descriptive 
statistics of the indices and describes the trends that can be observed in the indices. 
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Trilemma Indices 
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics for the constructed indices for monetary policy 
independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration.  
Table 5.1 Summary Statistics of the Trilemma Indices 
  
Monetary Policy 
Independence 
Exchange 
Rate Stability 
Financial 
Integration 
 Mean  0.491318  0.507139  0.422821 
 Median  0.507147  0.454910  0.439904 
 Maximum  0.706141  0.887655  0.900420 
 Minimum  0.157347  0.267822  0.006516 
 Standard Deviation  0.132374  0.158637  0.273789 
 Skewness -0.396779  0.891101 -0.051192 
 Kurtosis  2.430870  2.919269  1.862402 
    
 Jarque-Bera  1.271523  4.243682  1.739481 
 Probability  0.529532  0.119811  0.419060 
    
 Observations  32  32  32 
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From the table it can be observed that the exchange rate stability index has the highest mean 
of 0.51, monetary policy independence follows with a mean of 0.49 and financial integration 
comes last with a mean of 0.42. This could indicate that on average Malawi pursued a higher 
level of exchange rate stability compared to the other two intermediate policy goals. This is 
further examined later when weights assigned to each intermediate policy goal are taken into 
consideration. 
It can also be observed from the table that only exchange rate stability has a mean (0.51) that 
is higher than its median (0.45). The means for monetary policy independence (0.49) and 
financial integration (0.42) are less than their medians 0.51 and 0.44, respectively. This could 
indicate that only the exchange rate stability variable is skewed to the right whereas monetary 
policy independence and financial integration variables are skewed to the left. The positive 
skewness for exchange rate stability (0.89) confirms that the variable is skewed to the right, 
whereas the negative skewness for monetary policy independence (-0.40) and for financial 
integration (-0.05) confirm that the two variables are skewed to the left. The high mean and 
the positive skewness of exchange rate stability could indicate that on aggregate exchange rate 
stability dominated monetary policy independence and financial integration over the study 
period. That is, on average the country pursued higher levels of exchange rate stability than 
monetary policy independence and financial integration. 
Maximum values of 0.71 for monetary policy independence, 0.89 for exchange rate stability 
and 0.90 for financial integration could mean that over the study period, Malawi never 
pursued extreme levels8 of any of the trilemma intermediate policy goals. The minimum value 
for monetary policy independence (0.16) could indicate that over the study period, Malawi’s 
monetary policy was never fully dependent on the base country’s monetary policy, and the 
minimum value for exchange rate stability (0.27) could indicate that Malawi’s exchange rate 
was never fully floated over the study period. The minimum value for financial integration 
(0.007), however, could mean that at least at one point Malawi was almost a completely 
closed economy. 
Lastly, the standard deviations indicate that the financial integration variable has the highest 
spread (0.27) compared to exchange rate stability (0.16) and monetary policy independence 
(0.13). This can be observed in Figure 5.1. 
  
                                                          
8 As mentioned in Chapter four, the highest level for each of the policy variables would be 1 and the lowest level 
would be 0. 
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5.1.2 Preliminary Observations on the Trends of the Trilemma Indices 
Figure 5.1 below plots the trilemma indices in a single graph.  
Figure 5.1 Trilemma Indices 
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Trade-offs between the three indices that are implied by the trilemma can be observed from 
the graph. As one variable increases (decreases) at least one of the other two variables 
decreases (increases). For instance between 1983 and 1989 financial integration is higher than 
monetary policy independence and exchange rate stability. Between 1990 and 1994, however, 
financial integration declines, monetary policy independence becomes the highest pursued 
goal, whereas exchange rate stability fluctuates within low levels. From 1995 to 1997 
exchange rate stability overtakes the other two goals. Between 1998 and 2001 financial 
integration increases significantly while the other two fluctuate in the opposite direction. 
From 2002 to 2008 exchange rate stability rises significantly while financial integration falls 
to almost zero and monetary policy independence fluctuates. From 2009, exchange rate 
stability starts to fall, giving room for monetary policy independence and financial integration 
to rise. In 2012, while exchange rate stability is at its lowest level, financial integration rises 
tremendously and monetary policy independence, though higher than both indices, starts to 
fall. 
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Preliminary observation on the behaviour of the three indices relative to each other, thus, 
suggests that Malawi could be facing the trilemma between monetary policy independence, 
exchange rate stability and financial integration such that the pursuit of one intermediate 
policy goal could be trading off with at least one of the other two goals.  
5.2 Validity of the Macroeconomic Policy Trilemma in Malawi  
5.2.1 Unit Root Tests for Trilemma Indices 
It was stated in Chapter 4 that the study empirically tests the validity of the macroeconomic 
policy trilemma using OLS and that the method assumes that the variables in the regression 
are stationary. Before estimating the trilemma equation, therefore, the constructed indices are 
tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test. Table 5.2 presents the results 
of the test. 
Table 5.2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for the Trilemma Indices 
      t-Statistic p-value 
Monetary Policy 
Independence (MI) 
Index 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.979209  0.0000*** 
Test critical values: 1% level -3.670170 
 
 
5% level -2.963972 
 
  10% level -2.621007   
Exchange Rate Stability 
(ERS) Index 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.794295  0.0715* 
Test critical values: 1% level -3.679322 
 
 
5% level -2.967767 
 
  10% level -2.622989   
Financial Integration 
(FI) Index 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.882159  0.0593* 
Test critical values: 1% level -3.670170 
 
 
5% level -2.963972 
 
  10% level -2.621007   
 *** indicates stationarity at 1% level 
* indicates stationarity at 10% level 
 
The table shows that monetary policy independence index is stationary at 1% level of 
statistical significance, whereas exchange rate stability and financial integration indices are 
both stationary at 10% level. The indices are thus, used in regressions in their level form. 
The next section presents results of the formal test of the trilemma. 
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5.2.2 Empirical Test Results for the Validity of the Trilemma in Malawi  
Following the procedure described in Chapter 4, section 4.2, a linear form of the trilemma is 
tested using the Least Squares method by regressing a constant (one) on the constructed 
indices for the three intermediate policy goals. Table 5.3 provides a summary of the estimated 
regression output. 
Table 5.3 Estimated Trilemma Equation Output 
   
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
t 
Statistic P-value 
Monetary Policy Independence Index (MI) 0.719192 0.134129 5.361954 0.0000*** 
Exchange Rate Stability Index (ERS) 0.897575 0.079196 11.33361 0.0000*** 
Financial Integration Index (FI) 0.430407 0.077066 5.584907 0.0000*** 
          
R Square 0,99053198 
   Adjusted R Square 0,95539625 
   Standard Error 0,10221288 
   F 1011,31379 
   Significance F 1,2339E-28 
   Number of Observations 32       
 
*** indicates that coefficient is significant at 1% level       
 
  
According to Aizenman et al. (2008) and Hutchison et al. (2012), as mentioned in the 
preceding chapter, if the trilemma is binding so that the linear associations between the 
macroeconomic intermediate policy variables hold, the estimated linear regression should 
satisfy three key conditions: first, the model should fit the data well; second, all coefficients 
of the indices should be positive and significant; and third, the predicted values of the 
regression (i.e. the weighted sum of the indices: ?̂?1𝑀𝐼𝑡 + ?̂?2𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 + ?̂?3𝐹𝐼𝑡) should hover 
around the value of one. 
It is evident from Table 5.3 that the estimated linear model fits the data well. First of all, the 
R2 and Adjusted R2 (measures of goodness of fit of the model) are sufficiently high at 99% 
and 96%, respectively. Second, the F-statistic, which shows the joint significance of the 
explanatory variables, is highly significant at 1% level, indicating that the coefficients of the 
three indices are on aggregate different from zero. The low standard error of 0.102 of the 
regression is also another indication that the regression is a good fit. 
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Table 5.3 also shows that the second condition for the validity of the trilemma is satisfied. All 
three coefficients of the trilemma variables are positive and highly significant as indicated by 
low standard errors, large t-statistics (greater than 2) and low p-values (less than 1%).  
Regarding the third condition, Figure 5.2 depicts the predicted values of the regression. The 
figure indicates that the third condition for the trilemma to be considered binding is also 
satisfied: the predicted values hover around the value of one. Most importantly, their average 
is essentially one (0.99) as indicated in Table A1 (column aMI+bERS+cFI)9 of the Appendix. 
 
 
Correlations between individual contributions of the indices to the total (one) or to the 
predicted values (i. e. ?̂?1𝑀𝐼𝑡, ?̂?2𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡, and ?̂?3𝐹𝐼𝑡) also provide evidence that there are trade-
offs between the trilemma variables. As presented in Table 5.4 below, the three variables are 
negatively correlated with each other. This indicates that an increase in one variable is 
associated with a decrease in the other two variables, which is basically what the trilemma is 
based on.  
Table 5.4 Correlations between the Trilemma Indices 
 MI ERS FI 
MI 1.000000   
ERS -0.344059 1.000000  
FI -0.084329 -0.665213 1.000000 
 
                                                          
9 9 Note that aMI = ?̂?1𝑀𝐼𝑡; bERS = ?̂?2𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡; and cFI = ?̂?3𝐹𝐼𝑡  
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Figure 5.2 Predicted Values (aMI+bERS+cFI)
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Sufficient empirical evidence exists, therefore, that the macroeconomic policy trilemma is 
binding in Malawi. There are indeed trade-offs between monetary policy independence, 
exchange rate stability and financial integration. This confirms the preliminary observations 
in the indices discussed in section 5.1.2. The results also confirm that the relationship between 
the intermediate policy goals of the trilemma is linear as proposed by Aizenman et al. (2008). 
The correlations in Table 5.4 further indicate that the largest trade-off exists between 
exchange rate stability and financial integration in Malawi. This implies that the pursuit of 
financial integration in the country is associated with a greater level of instability in the 
exchange rate. This finding is in line with what happened in the country over the review 
period. The exchange rate was the most volatile in periods where the country pursued more 
financial integration, for instance from 2012, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
There are a number of single country studies that also found support for the trilemma using 
Aizenman et al. (2008) methodology. These include Algu & Creamer (2016) in South Africa, 
Hutchison et al. (2012) in India, Hsing (2012a; 2012b; 2013a; 2013b) in Greece, Bulgaria, 
Brazil and Poland respectively and Jian et al. (2011) in China. Cortuk et al. (2012) also found 
that the trilemma is a binding constraint in Turkey but used a different method. Similarly, 
using different approaches Bleaney et al. (2013), Frankel et al. (2004), Mandilaras (2014), 
Obstfeld et al. (2005) and Shambaugh (2004) found support for the trilemma in panel studies. 
5.2.3 Diagnostic Tests for the Trilemma Regression 
In order to ensure that the results of the trilemma test are reliable, as mentioned in Chapter 4, 
the original OLS model was tested for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and 
multicollinearity. The results presented in Table 5.5 indicate that multicollinearity is the only 
problem that can be ruled out confidently as indicated by the low variance inflation factors 
(less than 10). Serial correlation is present in the model, probably because the indices were 
smoothed. Heteroskedasticity can also not be ruled out. Accordingly, the OLS model 
presented in Table 5.3 and discussed above was estimated using robust standard errors that 
take into account the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. That is, 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors & covariance 
(Bartlett kernel, Newey-West) were used instead of ordinary standard errors. 
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Table 5.5 Diagnostic Tests for the Trilemma Regression 
        
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 10.00237 Prob. F(2,27) 0.0006 
Observed R-squared 13.61887 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0011 
  
  
  
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic 2.351716 Prob. F(3,28) 0.0937 
Observed R-squared 6.440273 Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.0920 
Scaled explained SS 2.869167 Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.4122 
  
  
  
Multicollinearity Test: Variance Inflation Factors   
Variable VIF     
Monetary Policy 
Independence  7.454007     
Exchange Rate Stability  5.190393 
 
  
Financial Integration  2.839425     
 
5.3 Determining the Dominant Combination 
Having found that the trilemma is a binding constraint in Malawi, it is useful to find out 
which combination of the three intermediate policy goals was prevalent over the study period. 
Following Aizenman et al. (2008), as stated in Chapter 4, determining the dominant 
combination involves analyzing the weights assigned to each policy goal of the trilemma 
during the review period and the contributions of the indices to the total (one) obtained from 
the trilemma regression.  
The weights assigned to each intermediate policy goal are represented by the coefficients of 
corresponding variables in the trilemma regression. From Table 5.3 it can be observed that 
exchange rate stability, with a coefficient of 0.90, received the highest weight during the 
review period compared to monetary policy independence and financial integration which 
have coefficients of 0.72 and 0.43, respectively. As earlier mentioned, however, Aizenman et 
al. (2008) point out that the coefficients alone are not enough to indicate the intermediate 
policy goal that was actually prioritized. They are more informative when combined with the 
actual values of corresponding indices. That is, the contributions (?̂?1𝑀𝐼, ?̂?2𝐸𝑅𝑆 and ?̂?3𝐹𝐼) 
provide more information. 
A full set of the contributions and the predicted values is presented in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. Only the mean values are reproduced in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6:  Means of Individual and Cumulative Contributions of the Trilemma Indices to 
the Total 
Individual Contributions 
?̂?𝟏𝑴𝑰 ?̂?𝟐𝑬𝑹𝑺 ?̂?𝟑𝑭𝑰 
 0,353351 0,455195682 0,181984835 
 
    Cumulative Contributions 
?̂?𝟏𝑴𝑰+, ?̂?𝟐𝑬𝑹𝑺 ?̂?𝟏𝑴𝑰 + ?̂?𝟑𝑭𝑰 ?̂?𝟐𝑬𝑹𝑺 + ?̂?𝟑𝑭𝑰 ?̂?𝟏𝑴𝑰 + ?̂?𝟐𝑬𝑹𝑺 + ?̂?𝟑𝑭𝑰 
0,808547 0,535336295 0,637180517 0,990531977 
 
 
The means of the individual contributions in the top section of Table 5.6, like the coefficients, 
reveal that, on average, exchange rate stability was prioritized over monetary policy 
independence and financial integration. 
Figure 5.310 is a graphical representation of the individual contributions from Table A1. The 
figure provides specific periods in which exchange rate stability dominated: 1983, 1987-1990, 
1994-1998, 2000, 2003-2011. Monetary policy independence dominated in some periods: 
1984-1986, 1991-1993, 2001-2002, and more recently from 2012 to 2014. Financial 
integration dominated only in 1999. 
Figure 5.3 Individual Contributions of the Trilemma Indices to the Total 
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Regarding the combination which was dominant during the study period, the bottom section 
of Table 5.6 presented above, provides cumulative contributions of possible pairs of the 
trilemma intermediate policy goals. The table indicates that the combination of monetary 
                                                          
10 Note that AMI = ?̂?1𝑀𝐼𝑡; BERS = ?̂?2𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡; and CFI = ?̂?3𝐹𝐼𝑡  
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policy independence and exchange rate stability was dominant among the three possible 
combinations.  
Figure 5.4 below confirms the dominance of the combination of monetary policy 
independence and exchange rate stability throughout the study period, except between 1998 
and 2000 when the combination of exchange rate stability and financial integration 
dominated. 
Figure 5.4 Cumulative Contributions of the Trilemma Indices to the Total 
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Indeed, the data reveals what happened in Malawi with regards to the three macroeconomic 
intermediate policy goals. As described in Chapter 3, for the most part of the review period, 
the exchange rate was either fixed or allowed to float within a small band. It was briefly fully 
floated in 1994 and 1998, according to Mangani (2012), Ngalawa & Viegi (2011) and 
Simwaka & Mkandawire (2011), when the country was considering financial liberalization. 
Both periods of free float, however, coincided with great macroeconomic instability in the 
country which rendered the full float unsustainable (Mangani, 2011; Mwabutwa, 2014; 
Simwaka & Mkandawire, 2011). It was only after the foreign exchange market reforms of 
2012 that the country stayed committed to a floating exchange rate. 
The country also managed to maintain an intermediate level of monetary policy independence 
during the review period. Mwabutwa (2014) and Ngalawa & Viegi (2011) noted that the 
monetary authorities changed the framework and conduct of monetary policy from targeting 
monetary aggregates to targeting interest rates and more recently, to targeting inflation. The 
need to maintain monetary policy independence was, perhaps, driven by the need to maintain 
a fixed or managed exchange rate. Without monetary policy independence it would have been 
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difficult for the monetary authorities to intervene in the foreign exchange market to keep the 
exchange rate stable. 
The dominance of the combination of exchange rate stability and monetary policy 
independence is in line with the earlier finding that there is a high tradeoff between exchange 
rate stability and financial integration. As the country pursued more of exchange rate stability, 
they had to give up financial integration 
This finding regarding the dominance of exchange rate stability and monetary policy 
independence over financial integration in Malawi is consistent with what Aizenman (2010), 
Aizenman et al. (2008; 2009; 2010) and Aizenman & Ito (2011) found for non-emerging 
market developing countries in general. As stated in Chapter 2, using aggregated data, these 
studies found that while developed and emerging market developing countries have markedly 
increased their level of financial integration since the 1970s, non-emerging market developing 
countries have lagged behind. Non-emerging market developing countries have instead 
prioritized exchange rate stability and monetary policy independence. Aizenman et al. (2008; 
2009) further found that Sub-Saharan African countries have especially held onto monetary 
policy independence and exchange rate stability while lagging considerably in financial 
integration, relative to other regions. The Sub-Saharan African countries have, however, 
recently started to open up their capital accounts and to embrace flexible exchange rates even 
though the progress is less marked (Aizenman et al., 2009). 
5.4 Examining the Impact of the Trilemma Intermediate Policy Goals on 
Macroeconomic Performance 
The last goal of the study is to examine the impact of the trilemma intermediate policy goals 
on macroeconomic performance over the review period. Specifically, the study looks at how 
output growth and the level and volatility of inflation have been affected by each of the 
trilemma intermediate policy goals. As previously mentioned, three Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions are estimated in this regard. The results are presented and discussed in section 
5.4.2. Section 5.4.1 presents results for unit root tests of the macroeconomic performance 
indicators and control variables and section 5.4.3 presents diagnostic test results for the 
estimated regressions.  
5.4.1 Unit Root Test Results for Macroeconomic Indicators and Control Variables 
The ADF test is also used to test for the presence of a unit root in the macroeconomic 
performance indicators and control variables. The results presented in Table 5.7 indicate that 
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GDP growth rate is stationary in levels, inflation is stationary at first difference, whereas the 
inflation volatility variable is stationary at second difference.  
The table also includes stationarity test results for total reserves which are measured in 
months of imports. The results indicate that the total reserves variable is stationary at first 
difference. The change in total reserve variable enters the regressions as a control variable and 
represents the effect of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. It is argued 
in literature (Altinkemer, 1998; Grenville, 2011; Hutchison et al., 2012; Sengupta, 2015) that 
the effects of the trilemma intermediate policy goals on macroeconomic performance is 
affected by the level and effectiveness of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange 
market. 
Table 5.7 Unit Root Test Results for Macroeconomic Performance Indicators -  Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Test 
  Level First Difference Second Difference 
  t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value 
GDP growth rate -3.181806  0.0308**         
Inflation -1.698119  0.4216 -4.858648 0.0005*** 
  Inflation Volatility -2.275463  0.1879 -2.327859  0.1730 -13.98922 0.0000*** 
Total Reserves in Months of 
Imports -2.172986  0.2199 -3.862430  0.0066***     
   
*** indicates stationarity at 1% level 
** indicates stationarity at 5% level 
    
 
5.4.2 Regression Results and Discussion 
Tables 5.8(a), (b) and (c) present estimation results for the three linear regressions. As 
previously mentioned, the macroeconomic performance indicators that are assessed are output 
growth rate, inflation rate and inflation volatility. The independent variables are the trilemma 
indices, lags of the dependent variables and the change in reserves variable. Not many control 
variables are included in the regressions because the sample size is small. Including too many 
control variables would have decreased the degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.8(a): The Impact of the Trilemma on Macroeconomic Performance – Output 
Growth Rate 
 
 
Variable  Coefficient S E t-stat p-value 
Monetary Policy Ind -0.892388 3.014558 -0.296026 0.7696 
Exchange Rate 
Stability 7.244818 3.310272 2.188587 0.0378*** 
Financial Integration -3.176140 1.880933 -1.688599 0.1033 
∆ in Reserves to 
GDP Ratio 2.365078 0.813810 2.906179 0.0074*** 
R2  0.565985 F - Stat 8.476441   
Adjusted R2  0.499213 F - Sign 0.000162   
SE (Regression) 1.836464 DW Stat 1.664648   
 
 
Table 5.8(b): The Impact of the Trilemma on Macroeconomic Performance – Inflation 
 
Variable Coefficient SE t-stat p-value 
Monetary Policy Ind -7.604128 9.649285 -0.788051 0.4384 
Exchange Rate 
Stability 10.53286 15.71264 0.670343 0.5090 
Financial Integration 33.72189 16.60956 2.030270 0.0536* 
∆ in Reserves to 
GDP Ratio -5.653164 3.632784 -1.556152 0.1328 
Lag of Inflation 0.452926 0.187251 2.418820 0.0235** 
R2  0.390298 F - stat 3.072695   
Adjusted R2  0.263276 F –Significance 0.027765 
 
Standard Error 5.848251 D-W Statistic 1.713564 
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Table 5.8(c): The Impact of the Trilemma on Macroeconomic Performance – Inflation 
Volatility 
 
 
Variable Coefficient SE t-stat p-value 
Monetary Policy Ind -2.136128 3.951244 -0.540622 0.5958 
Exchange Rate 
Stability -3.388792 3.972166 -0.853134 0.4054 
Financial Integration -4.267167 2.406181 -1.773419 0.0941* 
Lag of Inflation 
Volatility -0.852979 0.130663 -6.528061 0.0000*** 
R2  0.725582     
Adjusted R2  0.661012     
Standard Error 2.019454     
F – stat 11.23730     
Sign F – stat 0.000121     
 
 
 
*** coefficient is significant at 1% level 
   
  
** coefficient is significant at 5% level 
   
  
* coefficient is significant at 10% level      
 
5.4.2.1 Results on the Impact of the Trilemma Intermediate Policy Goals on the Output 
Growth Rate: 
The estimation results in Table 5.8 indicate that exchange rate stability is the only variable of 
the trilemma variables that has a significant effect on output growth rate in Malawi. It is 
positively related to the output growth rate; the pursuit of exchange rate stability contributes 
to faster economic growth in the country. The level of monetary policy independence and 
financial integration are not necessarily significant in determining the rate of output growth.  
The positive relationship between exchange rate stability and the rate of output growth is in 
line with the theoretical prediction that, according to Aizenman & Glick (2009), Aizenman & 
Ito (2011), Hsing (2013a) and Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015), stability in the exchange rate 
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enhances certainty and hence boosts consumer and investor confidence in the economy which 
in turn encourages spending, investment and eventually output growth.  
This result emphasizes the importance of having stable exchange rates in Malawi. The 
inconsistency of exchange rate policy over the review period could well be the reason why 
output growth has been insignificant in the country (Figure 3.1 above). 
Hsing (2012b; 2013b) and Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015) also found a positive relationship 
between the level of exchange rate stability and output growth in Bulgaria, Poland and 
Nigeria, respectively. Hsing (2012a), however, found no significant impact of exchange rate 
stability on output in Greece. 
The level of monetary policy independence may not be a significant factor in the rate of 
output growth because of the level of development of Malawi’s financial system. As 
mentioned previously, Malawi is a small economy with a financial system that is still 
developing. It can, therefore, not compete with the base country’s financial system which is 
more advanced. Whether Malawian interest rates follow South African interest rates or not, 
this would not necessarily have a large effect on investment or spending in the country. 
Investors would invest in Malawi because of other factors, not necessarily because of interest 
rate differentials between the two countries.  
No known single country study has yet analyzed the impact of monetary policy independence 
on output growth in Malawi. Studies done in other countries, however, produced mixed 
results, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Hsing (2013b) and Ihnatova & Cẳprarua (2014), as in the 
present case, found no significant impact of monetary policy independence on output in 
Poland and non-Euro European countries, respectively. Hsing (2012b; 2013a), however, 
found that monetary policy independence significantly reduced output growth rate in Bulgaria 
and Brazil, respectively. 
The level of financial integration being insignificant in determining the rate of output growth 
would be an indication that having controls or being open to cross boarder financial flows on 
its own does not necessarily translate into economic growth. It is mainly what happens to the 
exchange rate when the country pursues more or less financial integration that has an impact 
on the rate of output growth in Malawi; there are large tradeoffs between financial integration 
and exchange rate stability so that an increase (decrease) in the level of financial integration is 
associated with a decrease (increase) in the exchange rate. 
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Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015) analysed the impact of financial integration and exchange rate 
stability on output growth in Nigeria. Their results also indicted no significant effect of 
financial integration on output growth. Klein & Olivei (2008) and Hsing (2012b), however, 
found significant effects of financial integration on output growth. Klein & Olivei (2008) in a 
panel study found that countries with open capital accounts grow faster than those with closed 
capital accounts. They noted, however, that this was especially the case for developed 
economies. Hsing (2012b) found that the pursuit of financial integration in Bulgaria reduced 
the rate of output growth. 
As far as output growth is concerned, the estimation results suggest that, of the three 
intermediate policy goals of the trilemma, Malawi should concentrate on having stable 
exchange rates since stability in the exchange rate contributes to faster output growth. It can 
pursue fixed exchange rates or have floating exchange rates and allow the central bank to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market so that the exchange rate is kept stable. After all, an 
intervention variable, included in the model for output growth rate as a control variable, has a 
significant positive coefficient which means that central bank intervention in the foreign 
exchange market contributes to output growth. 
5.4.2.2 Results on the Impact of the Trilemma Intermediate Policy Goals on the Level and 
Volatility of Inflation 
With regards to the impact of the trilemma intermediate policy goals on inflation, the results 
in Table 5.8 indicate that only the level of financial integration significantly influences the 
level and volatility of inflation in Malawi. Higher levels of financial integration are associated 
with higher but less volatile inflation. The level of monetary policy independence and 
exchange rate stability are not necessarily significant in determining the level or volatility of 
inflation in the country.  
These results would seem to mean that it is the opening of borders to international financial 
flows that contributes to high inflation in Malawi, and not necessarily the independence of 
monetary policy or the pursuit of floating exchange rates. Financial integration exposes the 
country to rampant cross border financial flows. As mentioned previously, Malawi is a net 
importer. This means that with free capital mobility the country ends up importing 
international prices through imports which push up local prices, hence inflation. Additionally, 
the fact that financial integration is associated with exchange rate instability would mean that 
as the country pursues more financial integration, the exchange rate becomes volatile. This 
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increases uncertainty in the country and in turn low production. Low production increases 
inflation, argued from the principle of demand and supply. 
The positive relationship between the level of financial integration and inflation is line with 
the country’s experience during the study period. It can be observed in the inflation series, in 
Figure 3.2, and in the financial integration index graph in Figure 5.1 that periods of high 
levels of financial integration coincide with periods of high inflation. For instance, around 
1987, 1998 and 2012, the government loosened a lot of controls in a bid to open up the 
country’s economy to international markets; these are the same periods when inflation spiked 
as shown in Figure 3.2 and as also noted by Mangani (2012), Ngalawa & Viegi (2011) and 
Simwaka & Mkandawire (2011). Additionally, exchange controls were tight during the period 
between 2002 and 2011, coinciding with a time of low inflation (Mangani, 2011). 
This result is contrary to what Aizenman et al. (2008) and Mandilaras (2014) found for a 
combination of countries. Their results indicated that more financial integration is associated 
with lower levels of inflation. Aizenman et al. (2008), however, noted that this is especially 
the case in emerging market economies. Some single country studies such as Hsing (2012a; 
2013a; 2013b) in Greece, Brazil and Poland, respectively, and Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015) in 
Nigeria obtained similar results.  
Regarding the effect of financial integration on inflation volatility, this study’s results 
compare with most studies, both panel and single country.  To mention a few, Ihnatova & 
Cẳprarua (2014) found that more financial integration reduced inflation volatility in Central 
and Eastern European countries. Single country studies Hsing (2012a; 2013a; 2013b) and 
Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015) found similar results in Greece, Brazil, Poland and Nigeria, 
respectively. Hutchison et al. (2012), however, obtained contrary; financial integration was 
found to be associated with higher inflation volatility in India. 
The result regarding the effect of monetary policy independence on inflation could also be 
due to the level of development of the financial system in Malawi, as discussed earlier. The 
level of monetary policy independence being an insignificant factor in the level of inflation 
and inflation volatility would be due to the fact that the country’s financial system is small 
and underdeveloped, so that interest rate differentials between Malawi and South Africa 
would matter less in international investors’ and consumers’ decisions.    
This result would also raise questions on the effectiveness and prudence of monetary policy in 
Malawi. The most important function of monetary policy is to control inflation. Monetary 
policy independence should, therefore, give a country the ability to control domestic inflation. 
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If this is not the case, it would mean that either monetary authorities are not effective in their 
efforts to control inflation in the country, or they are not prudent enough in their conduct of 
monetary policy. They could be using monetary policy for other purposes such financing 
fiscal deficits. Both of these are a possibility for Malawi. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
World Bank Report (2015, October 19) indicates that weak fiscal discipline is a major 
contributor to Malawi’s macroeconomic instability. The report states that the Malawi 
government has been running large fiscal deficits due to expenditure pressure emanating from 
rising cost of servicing debt, the need to settle outstanding arrears, ever increasing wage 
demands and high cost of agricultural subsidy schemes. It was also mentioned in Chapter 3 
that Malawi relies heavily on foreign aid such that any shocks to donor budget support forces 
the government to continue borrowing heavily from the domestic market to finance fiscal 
deficits. Thus, the insignificance of the effect of monetary policy independence on inflation in 
Malawi could be an indication of the need for further investigation on the effectiveness and 
prudence of monetary policy in the country. 
The study’s results regarding the effect of monetary policy independence on the level and 
volatility of inflation differ from the results found in panel studies that included Malawi, such 
as Aizenman (2010) and Aizenman et al. (2008; 2010). While this study has found an 
insignificant negative effect of monetary policy independence on both the level and volatility 
of inflation in Malawi, Aizenman (2010) and Aizenman et al. (2008; 2010) found that 
countries with greater levels of monetary policy independence experience significantly higher 
levels of inflation compared to countries with lower levels of independence and that this 
effect is more pronounced for developing countries relative to developed countries. For the 
effect on inflation volatility, Aizenman et al. (2008) found a significant negative effect of 
monetary policy on inflation volatility. 
A number of single country studies also found contrary results to what was found by 
Aizenman et al. (2008) using aggregated data. Hutchison et al. (2012) applied the same 
Aizenman et al. (2008) methodology in India and found that greater monetary policy 
independence has a significant effect on lowering the level of inflation but no significant 
effect on inflation volatility. Hsing (2012b; 2013b) also applying Aizenman et al. (2008) 
methodology in Bulgaria and Poland, respectively, found no significant effect of monetary 
policy independence on either the level or the volatility of inflation, similar to the results of 
this study.  
As regards the effect of exchange rate stability on the level and volatility of inflation, Table 
5.8 indicates that exchange rate stability has no significant effect on the level and volatility of 
89 
 
inflation in Malawi. This result is surprising. Exchange rate stability should contribute to low 
and stable inflation through stabilizing international prices. The insignificance of the impact 
of exchange rates stability on inflation could mean that inflation in Malawi is a function of 
other factors such as food prices and financial integration as already discussed, and not 
necessarily the level of exchange rate stability.  
This result contrasts with what Aizenman (2010) and Aizenman et al. (2008; 2010) found for 
an aggregate of countries and what Hsing (2013a) and Hutchison et al. (2012) found for some 
individual countries. Aizenman (2010) and Aizenman et al. (2008; 2010) found that countries 
with greater levels of exchange rate stability experience lower levels of inflation whereas 
those with lower levels of exchange rate stability experience higher levels of inflation. Hsing 
(2013a) found that in Brazil greater levels of exchange rate stability are associated with lower 
levels of inflation; and Hutchison et al (2012) found that exchange rate stability has a 
dampening effect on inflation volatility in India.  
The result, however, compares with those of Hsing (2012a) and Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015) 
who also found no significant effect of exchange rate stability on the level and volatility of 
inflation in Greece and Nigeria, respectively.  
Thus, the results of this study indicate that of the trilemma intermediate policy goals, only 
exchange rate stability has a significant effect on the rate of output growth. Higher levels of 
exchange rate stability contribute to faster output growth. The results also indicate that only 
financial integration has significant effects on the level and volatility of inflation. The pursuit 
of financial integration is associated with higher but less volatile inflation in Malawi. 
 
5.4.3 Diagnostic Tests 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the credibility of the results depends on whether the 
assumptions of the OLS method are satisfied in the estimated models. For this reason this 
section presents results of some of the important diagnostic tests that were carried out on the 
estimated models on the impact of the trilemma intermediate policy goals on output growth 
and inflation. 
Table 5.9 presents results for Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation and Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 5.9 Tests for Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity 
Output Growth Rate 
Regression 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:     
F-statistic 0.319932     Prob. F(2,24) 0.7292 
Observed R-squared 0.805027     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.6686 
    
  
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
 
  
F-statistic 0.138501     Prob. F(4,26)   0.9665 
Observed R-squared 0.646761     Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.9577 
Scaled explained SS 0.533017     Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.9702 
  
    
  
Inflation Regression Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:    
F-statistic 1.832190     Prob. F(2,22) 0.1837 
Observed R-squared 4.283422     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.1175 
    
  
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey     
F-statistic 1.091621     Prob. F(5,24)   0.3904 
Observed R-squared 5.558509     Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.3516 
Scaled explained SS 4.512513     Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.4782 
  
    
  
Inflation Volatility  
Regression 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:     
F-statistic 0.039353     Prob. F(2,15)   0.9615 
Observed R-squared 0.114833     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.9442 
    
  
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey     
F-statistic 0.970534     Prob. F(4,17)   0.4491 
F-statistic 0.970534     Prob. F(4,17) 0.4491 
Observed R-squared 4.089954     Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.3940 
Scaled explained SS 1.469200     Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.8321 
 
The large probability values indicate that the null hypotheses of no serial correlation and no 
heteroskedasticity in the estimated regressions for the impact of the trilemma variables on 
output growth rate, level of inflation and inflation volatility cannot be rejected.  
Table 5.10 presents Variance Inflation Factors from multicollinearity tests for the three 
estimated regressions. 
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Table 5.10 Multicollinearity Tests: Variance Inflation Factors 
Variable 
VIFs for Output 
Growth Rate 
Regression 
VIFs for 
Inflation 
Regression 
VIFs for 
Inflation 
Volatility 
Regression 
Monetary Policy Independence  1.463486  1.687433  1.627406 
Exchange Rate Stability  2.526218  1.897741  2.640354 
Financial Integration  2.398501  2.941679  2.427926 
Change in Reserves to GDP Ratio  1.196813  1.384558   
Lag of Output Growth Rate  N/A 
 
  
Lag of Inflation 
 
 2.350885   
Lag of Inflation Volatility      1.047607 
 
From the table, it can be observed that the variance inflation factors for all the three 
regressions are low (less than 10). This indicates that multicollinearity is also not a problem in 
the data. 
The absence of serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity in the estimated 
regressions render the results presented and discussed in the preceding sections reliable so 
that inferences can be drawn from the models. 
5.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The study has found that the macroeconomic policy trilemma is a binding constraint in 
Malawi. There are indeed trade-offs between monetary policy independence, exchange rate 
stability and financial integration; Malawi cannot pursue optimal levels of all the three 
intermediate policy goals of the trilemma simultaneously. It can pursue at most only two at a 
point in time. 
The study has also found that the largest trade-off exists between exchange rate stability and 
financial integration in Malawi. This implies that as the country pursues more of financial 
integration, exchange rates become volatile. In other words, the pursuit of stable exchange 
rates in the country is associated with a greater loss in financial integration relative to a loss in 
monetary policy independence. 
Another important finding is that during the study period (1983-2014) on aggregate Malawi 
prioritised stable exchange rates compared to monetary policy independence and financial 
integration. The combination which was dominant over the review period is exchange rate 
stability and monetary policy independence. Financial integration was the least pursued 
intermediate policy goal. 
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As regards how the three intermediate policy goals affect economic performance in Malawi, it 
has been found that exchange rate stability is the only intermediate policy goal that affects the 
rate of output growth. Greater levels of exchange rate stability are associated with higher rates 
of output growth. Monetary policy independence and financial integration are not significant 
factors in the growth rate of output. This result would imply that the indifferent output growth 
experienced in the country over the review period could be the result of inconsistent pursuit of 
exchange rate stability in the country. If high growth is to be realised and sustained, Malawi 
should, therefore, concentrate on having stable exchange rates. 
On the effect of the intermediate policy goals on inflation, the estimation results indicate that 
financial integration significantly influences both the level and volatility of inflation. Greater 
levels of financial integration are associated with high but less volatile inflation. Monetary 
policy independence and exchange rate stability have no significant impacts on inflation. 
The data, thus, has revealed that exchange rate stability is the most important of the three 
macroeconomic intermediate policy goals. The Malawi economy would really benefit in 
terms of economic growth if the country keeps its focus on stable exchange rates. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Summary of the Study 
The study set out to empirically examine the prevalence and macroeconomic effects of the 
trilemma between monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial 
integration in Malawi. It was observed that since independence in 1964, the country has had 
several reforms relating to the three intermediate policy goals of the trilemma. The framework 
and conduct of monetary policy have over the years evolved from the use of direct tools such 
as direct controls on interest rates and credit by the government during the early years of 
independence, to indirect ones such as targeting monetary aggregates in the late 1980s and in 
the 1990s, and targeting interest rates within the context of an inflation target in more recent 
years. Exchange rate policy has fluctuated a great deal; beginning with a fixed rate regime 
when the country just gained independence to a floating rate regime in 1994, managed float in 
1995, crawling peg in 1997, free float in 1998, fixed rate with periodic adjustments in 2003 
and eventually free float in 2012. Financial integration policy has also changed over the years, 
with more onerous exchange controls in some periods and relatively more open borders in 
other periods.  
These macroeconomic policy reforms were directed towards achieving high and sustainable 
economic growth. It was observed, however, that despite the reforms, in the last three decades 
Malawi has barely achieved desirable macroeconomic performance. The country has 
registered indifferent economic growth and relatively high and unstable inflation.  
In view of this, the study was based on the proposition that the numerous macroeconomic 
policy reforms that Malawi has gone through over the years could be due to the constraints of 
the trilemma between monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial 
integration; and that the trilemma could have contributed to the indifferent macroeconomic 
performance the country has registered over the years. The ‘trilemma’ theory (also known as 
the ‘impossible trinity’) in the field of International Finance and Macroeconomics, according 
to Aizenman et al. (2008), Hutchison et al. (2012) and Obstfeld et al. (2005), predicts that a 
country cannot simultaneously achieve optimal levels of monetary policy independence, 
exchange rate stability and financial integration; there are trade-offs between these three 
intermediate policy goals such that an improvement in one intermediate policy goal has a 
negative impact on at least one of the other two. Countries are, therefore, faced with a 
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challenge of having to choose at most two of the three intermediate policy goals at a point in 
time. 
Accordingly, the study set out to achieve three specific goals: first, to empirically evaluate the 
trade-offs between monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial 
integration in Malawi in a bid to ascertain if the trilemma is a binding constraint in the 
country; second, to determine the combination of the trilemma intermediate policy goals that 
has been dominant in the country in the last three decades, given the constraints of the 
trilemma; and third, to assess how the pursuit of the trilemma intermediate policy goals has 
affected macroeconomic performance in Malawi, specifically with regards to the rate of 
output growth and the level and volatility of inflation. 
The study adopted an existing methodology in literature that was developed by Aizenman et 
al. (2008) and also used by Aizenman et al. (2009; 2010; 2011; 2012), Hsing (2012a; 2012b; 
2013a; 2013b), Hutchison et al. (2012) and Jian et al. (2011), among others. It is a positivist 
quantitative approach. It involved, first of all, constructing indices that measure Malawi’s 
level of achievement in each of the three intermediate policy goals of the trilemma. The 
validity of the trilemma in Malawi (the first goal of the study) was then tested by applying 
OLS techniques to estimate a linear model in which a constant (one) was regressed on the 
three constructed indices. The results of this model showed support for the trilemma: there are 
indeed trade-offs between monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and 
financial integration in Malawi so that the pursuit of one policy goal is associated with a 
decrease in at least one of the other two. Correlations between the indices of the trilemma 
intermediate policy goals further indicated that the largest trade-off (-0.66) exists between 
exchange rate stability and financial integration. This means that as the country pursues more 
of exchange rate stability, financial integration declines by a larger magnitude compared to 
monetary policy independence. 
Having found that the trilemma is a binding constraint in Malawi, it was imperative to find 
out which combination of the trilemma intermediate policy goals the country prioritised over 
the study period (1983 to 2014). Understanding the dominant combination would shade more 
light on how the economy performed during the period. This second goal of the study was 
explored by analysing the means and graphs of individual and cumulative contributions of the 
trilemma intermediate policy goals to the total (one) obtained from the estimated trilemma 
regression. It was found that on average Malawi prioritised exchange rate stability over 
monetary policy independence which was in turn prioritised over financial integration. That 
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is, the combination of exchange rate stability and monetary policy independence was 
dominant during the review period.  
This finding is in line with the results Aizenman (2010), Aizenman et al. (2008; 2009; 2010) 
and Aizenman & Ito (2011) obtained in panel studies, that since the 1970s non-emerging 
market developing countries, especially Sub-Saharan African countries, have prioritised 
exchange rate stability and monetary policy independence at the expense of financial 
integration. They, however, noted that the non-emerging market developing countries have 
recently started to embrace financial integration even though the progress is less marked. 
To assess how the trilemma affected macroeconomic performance in Malawi during the 
review period (the third goal of the study), the study specifically analysed the impact of the 
trilemma intermediate policy goals on output growth rate and the level and volatility of 
inflation. The aim, as alluded to, was to find out if the country’s macroeconomic performance 
over the last three decades could be attributed to the pursuit of the trilemma intermediate 
policy goals. The Ordinary Least Squares method was used in this regard. Three linear models 
were estimated in which each of the macroeconomic performance indicator variables were 
regressed on the trilemma intermediate policy goals, lags of the dependent variables and 
international reserves.  
The results indicated that, of the three intermediate policy goals of the trilemma, only 
exchange rate stability has a significant impact on the rate of output growth in Malawi. 
Greater levels of exchange rate stability are associated with faster output growth. This could 
explain why the country prioritised exchange rate stability during the review period. It was 
noted, however, that the country was not consistent in its pursuit of exchange rate stability. 
The exchange rate policy changed a great deal over the period. This could explain why output 
growth has been indifferent in the country.  
This result compares with those of Hsing (2012b; 2013b) and Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015) 
who also found a positive relationship between the level of exchange rate stability and output 
growth in Bulgaria, Poland and Nigeria, respectively. The result, however, contrasts with 
Hsing (2012a) who found no significant impact of exchange rate stability on output in Greece. 
As regards the impact of the trilemma intermediate policy goals on inflation, the study found 
that between monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration, 
only financial integration significantly influences the level and volatility of inflation in 
Malawi. The pursuit of financial integration is associated with high but less volatile inflation. 
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This could explain why financial integration has been a slow process in the country in the last 
three decades.  
The result differs from those of Aizenman et al. (2008) and Mandilaras (2014) who found a 
negative relationship between financial integration and inflation in a cross section of 
countries. A number of single-country studies also found a negative relationship between 
financial integration and inflation. These include Hsing (2012a; 2013a; 2013b) in Greece, 
Brazil and Poland, respectively, and Ogbuagu & Ewubare (2015) in Nigeria. The differences 
in the findings confirm that the effects of the trilemma intermediate policy goals on 
macroeconomic performance depend on country-specific factors. Country-specific studies are, 
therefore, necessary if the aim is to understand the effects of the trilemma in specific 
countries.  
It would have been of great value to compare the findings of this study, especially on the 
impact of the trilemma intermediate policy goals on macroeconomic performance, with 
findings of other single-country studies in non-emerging market developing countries. The 
literature review, however, revealed that there are very few single-country studies on the 
trilemma concept in this income group. Most studies are concentrated in developed and 
emerging market countries. Single-country studies on the subject are, however, needed in 
non-emerging market developing countries especially now that most countries in this income 
group, as earlier stated, are starting to embrace financial integration. This study could help to 
narrow the literature gap, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The study is especially relevant for Malawi because, as previously mentioned, the country has 
gone through numerous reforms over the years trying to find the policy mix that would 
encourage macroeconomic stability for sustainable economic growth. The findings of this 
study not only bring to light the prevalence and nature of the trilemma between monetary 
policy independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration in the country, but also 
point out the potential impacts of each of these three intermediate policy goals on 
macroeconomic performance, and thereby suggest the intermediate policy goals that are 
beneficial for the country. 
6.2 Policy Recommendations 
In general, the study found that the trilemma between monetary policy independence, 
exchange rate stability and financial integration is a binding constraint in Malawi; in light of 
the trilemma, the country has, in the last three decades, prioritised exchange rate stability and 
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monetary policy independence at the expense of financial integration. The study also found 
that, of the three intermediate policy goals of the trilemma, exchange rate stability is the most 
important as it contributes to faster economic growth; whereas financial integration increases 
inflation. Monetary policy independence was consistently found to have no significant effect 
on output growth rate and inflation. 
There are a number of policy recommendations that can be drawn from these findings. To 
begin with, the trilemma being a binding constraint means that the simultaneous pursuit of the 
three intermediate policy goals can lead to economic instability in the country. Caution 
should, therefore, be taken when pursuing these three intermediate policy goals.  
Secondly, the significant positive relationship between exchange rate stability and the rate of 
output growth emphasises the importance of having stable exchange rates in Malawi. The 
indifferent economic growth that the country has registered in the last three decades could 
have emanated from the fact that the country has not been consistent in its pursuit of exchange 
rate stability. As previously mentioned, exchange rate policy has gone back and forth between 
fixed and flexible regimes. If the country hopes to achieve faster and sustainable economic 
growth, therefore, the authorities should focus on having stable exchange rates consistently.  
Currently Malawi has a floating exchange rate regime. At the same time the country is 
encouraging financial integration. The findings of this study could be a caution to policy 
makers to take special care in the pursuit of the combination of floating exchange rates and 
financial integration. The finding that exchange rate stability has a direct relationship with 
output growth rate implies that unstable exchange rates are associated with slow economic 
growth. It has also been found that financial integration is associated with high inflation in the 
country. The pursuit of financial integration combined with floating exchange rates could, 
therefore, be a recipe for an era of slow economic growth and high inflation in the country. 
The authorities should question the extent to which these macroeconomic policies, which are 
mostly based on theory and conditions prevailing in developed countries, are directly 
applicable to a small developing economy like Malawi. 
Further, the finding that monetary policy independence has no significant effect on output 
growth and inflation means that it does not matter much whether Malawian interest rates 
follow South African interest rates. International investors and consumers would not base 
their decisions on interest rate differentials between the two countries. This is an indication 
that Malawi’s financial system cannot compete on the international market, especially with 
South Africa’s financial system. Financial integration will, therefore, not achieve much in the 
98 
 
country with the current level of development of the financial system. The development of the 
financial system, through for instance, encouraging competition, product innovation and 
modern payment systems, should, therefore, be one of the priority goals for policy makers in 
the country.  
Lastly, the insignificance of the effect of monetary policy independence on output growth rate 
and inflation would also raise concerns on the effectiveness of monetary policy in the country. 
A review of the tools for monetary policy would, therefore, be recommended. 
6.3 Study Limitations 
The study was not without limitations. The most notable challenges encountered relate to data 
availability. Some data for the years before 1983 and for the year 2015 were not available. 
Also, GDP is available only in annual frequency in Malawi. Using annual figures coupled 
with the unavailability of some data in some years meant that the study had to use a small 
number of observations. This could have affected the results. Additionally, with the small 
sample size, the regressions for the impact of the trilemma intermediate policy goals on 
macroeconomic performance did not control for all determinants of output growth rate and 
inflation.  
6.4 Areas for Further Research 
Most small open economies in Sub-Saharan Africa like Malawi are facing challenges with 
regards to monetary policy, exchange rate policy and financial integration. These policies are 
actually becoming complicated in today’s world where globalisation is greatly encouraged. 
Studies on these policies, however, remain scant in Sub-Saharan Africa. Research on these 
policies is, therefore, encouraged in this region. 
Future research on the trilemma concept in Malawi or in other non-emerging market 
developing countries could compare the performance of different measures of the three 
intermediate policy goals of the trilemma. For instance, this study used a de facto measure of 
financial integration; future research could compare the performance of the de facto measure 
with a de jure measure such as the Chinn-Ito Index. Similarly, monetary policy independence 
in this study was measured by using correlations between Malawian interest rates and South 
African interest rates; future research could use correlations of Malawian interest rates with 
average interest rates of SADC countries.  
  
99 
 
References 
 
Aizenman, J. (2010). The impossible trinity (aka the policy trilemma): The encyclopedia of  
financial globalization. University of California, Santa Cruz, Department of 
Economics Working Paper Series. 
 Retrieved from http://escholarship.org/uc/item/9k29n6qn 
Aizenman, J., Chinn, M. D., & Ito, H. (2008). Assessing the emerging global financial  
architecture: Measuring the trilemma's configurations over time. National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper Series, 14533. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14533 
Aizenman, J., Chinn, M. D., & Ito, H. (2009). The impossible trinity hypothesis in an era of  
global imbalances: Measurement and testing. 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/ACI_Trilemma_s_Oct09.pdf 
Aizenman, J., Chinn, M. D., & Ito, H. (2010). The financial crisis: Rethinking of the global  
financial architecture and the trilemma. Asian Development Bank Institute Working 
Paper Series, 213. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1592810 
Aizenman, J., & Ito, H. (2011). The “impossible trinity,” the international monetary  
framework, and the Pacific Rim. The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of the 
Pacific Rim. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199751990.013.022  
Aizenman, J., Chinn, M. D., & Ito, H. (2013). The “impossible trinity” hypothesis in an era of  
global imbalances: Measurement and testing. Review of International Economics, 
21(3), 447–458. DOI: 10.1111/roie.12047 
Algu, Y., & Creamer, K. (2016). A Macroeconomic Trilemma or Dilemma? Evaluating South  
Africa’s Open Economy. University of the Witwatersrand 
Altinkemer, M. (1998). Capital inflows and central bank’s policy response. The Central Bank  
of the Republic of Turkey Research Department Discussion Paper, 0103. 
Bekaert, G., Wei, M., & Xing, Y. (2007). Uncovered interest rate parity and the term 
structure.  Journal of International Money and Finance, 26, 1038-1069. 
Bleaney, M., Lee, H. A., & Lloyd, T. (2013). Testing the trilemma: exchange rate regimes,  
capital mobility and monetary independence. Oxford Economics Papers, 65(4), 876-
897. DOI:10.1093/oep/gps038  
Bordo, M. D. (1981). The classical gold standard: Some lessons for today. Federal Reserve  
Bank of St. Luis Review, 63(5), 2-17 
 
 
100 
 
Buigut, S., & Rao, V. K. (2011). International financial integration of the Indian money  
market. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 3(4), 170-180. 
DOI:10.5539/ijef.v3n4p170 
Chinn, M. D., & Ito, H. (2007). A New Measure of Financial Openness. Journal of  
Comparative Policy Analysis, 10(3), 309-322. 
Chipeta, C., & Mkandawire, M. L. C. (1991). The informal financial sector and   
macroeconomic adjustment in Malawi. African Economic Research Consortium 
(AERC) Research Paper, 4, Nairobi, Kenya. 
Cortuk, O., Akcelik, Y., & Turhan, I. (2012). Mitigating Turkey’s trilemma trade-offs. 
Central Bank of Turkey, MPRA, 40101. 
Cumby, R. E., & Obstfeld, M. (1982). International interest rate and price-level linkages 
under flexible exchange rates: A review of recent evidence. National Bureau of 
Economic Research. Working Paper No. 921. 
European Commission, (4 May 2009). Greece and the Euro, Economic and Financial Affairs, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/countries/greece_en.htm, Retrieved on 13 
May, 2016 
Faure, A. P. (2013). Foreign exchange market: An introduction. 1st ed. Quoin Institute (Pty)  
Limited, bookboon.com 
Francis, B. B., Hasan, I., & Hunter, D. M. (2002). Emerging market liberalisation and the  
impact on uncovered interest rate parity. Journal of International Money and Finance,  
21, 931-956. 
Frankel, J. A., Schmukler, S. L., & Serven, L. (2004). Global transmission of interest rates:  
Monetary independence and currency regime. Journal of International Money and 
Finance, 23, 701-733.  
Garnaut, R. (1998). Exchange Rates in the East Asian Crisis. In Southeast Asia’s economic  
crisis: Origins, lessons and the way forward. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 15(3), 328-
337 
Globan, T. (2014). Testing the ‘trilemma’ in post-transition Europe: A new empirical measure  
of capital mobility. Post-Communist Economies, 26(4), 459-476. DOI: 
10.1080/14631377.2014.964459 
Grenville, S. (2011). The impossible trinity and capital flows in East Asia. Asian 
Development Bank Institute Working Paper, 319. Retrieved from 
http://www.eaber.org/sites/default/files/documents/2011.11.07.wp319.impossible.trini
ty.capital.flows_.east_.asia_.pdf 
 
101 
 
Hosny, A. S., Kishor, N. K., & Bahmani-Oskooee, M. (2015). Understanding the dynamics of  
the macroeconomic trilemma. International Review of Applied Economics, 29(1), 32-
64, DOI: 10.1080/02692171.2014.933788 
Hutchison, M., Sengupta, R., & Singh, N. (2012). India’s trilemma: Financial liberalisation,  
exchange rates and monetary policy. The World Economy, 35(1), 3-18. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1467-9701.2011.01381.x 
Hsing, Y. (2012a). Impacts of the trilemma policies on inflation, growth and volatility in  
Greece. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 2(3), 373-378.  
Hsing, Y. (2012b). Effects of the trilemma policies on inflation, growth and volatility in  
Bulgaria. Theoretical and Applied Economics, 19(4), 49-58. 
Hsing, Y. (2013a). Study of the trilemma policies and their impacts on inflation, growth and  
volatility for Brazil. Global Journal of Management and Business Research Finance, 
13(5), 26-31. 
Hsing, Y. (2013b). Testing the trilemma hypothesis and measuring their effects on inflation,  
growth and volatility for Poland. Montenegrin Journal of Economics, 9(3), 57-63. 
Ihnatova, I., & Cẳprarua, B. (2014). The trilemma policies and macroeconomic volatility in  
Central and Eastern Europe. Procedia Economics and Finance, 15, 853-857. DOI: 
10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00547-4 
International Monetary Fund. The end of the Bretton Woods System (1972–81). Retrieved on  
24 May, 2016, from https://www.imf.org/external/about/histend.htm  
International Monetary Fund. (2015, December). Malawi Selected Issues 2015. IMF Country  
Report, 15/346, Retrieved on 29 June, 2016, from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=43468.0 
Jian, H., Shaoyi, C., & Yanzhi, S. (2011). Capital inflows and the impossible trinity in China.  
Journal of International and Global Economic Studies, 4(2), 30-46. 
Klein, M. W., & Olivei, G. P. (2008). Capital account liberalisation, financial depth and  
economic growth. Journal of International Money and Finance, 27(6), 861-875. 
Kose, M. A., Prasad, E., Rogoff, K., & Wei, S. J. (2006). Financial Globalisation: A  
reappraisal. International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 189. 
Levine, R. (2001). International financial liberalisation and economic growth. Review of  
International Economics, 9(4), 688-702. 
Lungu, M. (2015). Sources of macroeconomic imbalances in Malawi and policy solutions.  
Global Advanced Research Journal of Economics, Accounting and Finance, 3(2), 
026-040, http://garj.org/garjeaf 
 
102 
 
Mandilaras, A. S. (2014). The international policy trilemma in the post-Bretton Woods era. 
Journal of Macroeconomics, 44, 18-32. DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2015.02.004. 
Mangani, R. (2011). The effects of monetary policy in Malawi. A research project funded by  
the African Economic Research Consortium. University of Malawi. 
Mangani, R. (2012). The Effects of Monetary Policy on Prices in Malawi. African Economic  
Research Consortium (AERC) Research Paper, 252, Nairobi, Kenya. 
Mwabutwa, C. N. (2014). Essays on Financial Reforms and Monetary Policy in Malawi. A  
Doctor of Philosophy (Economics) Thesis. University of Pretoria. Retrieved on 1 July 
2016 from http://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/43194 
Ngalawa, H., & Viegi, N. (2011). Dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks in Malawi. 
South African Journal of Economics, 79(3), 224-227. 
Obstfeld, M., Shambaugh, J. C., & Taylor, A. M. (2005). The trilemma in history: Tradeoffs  
among exchange rates, monetary policies, and capital mobility. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 87(3), 423-438. DOI: 10.1162/0034653054638300 
Obstfeld, M., & Taylor, A. M. (1997). The great depression as a watershed: International  
capital mobility over the long run. National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper Series, 5960. 
Ogbuagu, A. R., & Ewubare, D. B. (2015). Financial integration, exchange rate stability and  
macroeconomic variables in Nigeria: A structural impact. Research in World 
Economy, 6(3), 36-54. DOI:10.5430/rwe.v6n3p36 
Patnaik, I., & Shah, A. (2010). Asia confronts the impossible trinity. National Institute of  
Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi, Working Paper 2010-64. 
http://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2013/04/wp_2010_64.pdf 
Republic of Malawi Government. (2016). Draft 2016-2017 Financial Statement. Budget  
Document No. 3. Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development.  
Retrieved on 29 June, 2016, retrieved from 
http://www.finance.gov.mw/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=90
&Itemid=114 
Republic of Malawi Government. (2016). 2016/2017 National Budget Statement.  
Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development. Retrieved on 29 June, 
2016, from 
http://www.finance.gov.mw/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=90
&Itemid=114 
Reserve Bank of Malawi. (2016, January 06). Monetary Policy Statement #3. Retrieved from  
http://rbm.mw/MonetaryPolicy 
103 
 
Reserve Bank of Malawi. (2016, January 28). Press Statement: Malawi Kwacha Depreciation  
and Near-Term Prospects. Retrieved on 29 June, 2016, from 
http://rbm.mw/MediaCenter/PressReleases/  
Reserve Bank of Malawi. (2016, March). Monthly Economic Review. Retrieved on 28 June,  
2016, from http://rbm.mw/Publications/EconomicReviews 
Schoenmaker, D. (2011). The financial trilemma. Economics letters, 111, 57-59 
Sengupta, R. (2015). The impossible trinity: Where does India stand? Indira Gandhi Institute  
of Development Research, WP-2015-05. Retrieved from  
 http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2015 05.pdf 
Shambaugh, J. C. (2004). The effect of fixed exchange rates on monetary policy. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 301-352. 
Simwaka, K., & Mkandawire, L. (2011). The efficacy of foreign exchange market 
intervention in Malawi. African Economic Research Consortium Research Paper, 216, 
Nairobi. Kenya.  
Toit, D. (2014). The Foreign Exchange Market. The South African Institute of Financial  
Markets (SAIFM) 
World Bank. (2008). Malawi Financial Sector Assessment. 44966. Based on the Joint  
International Monetary Fund – World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programme. 
Retrieved on 29 June, 2016, from 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/07/9757847/malawi-financial-sector-
assessment 
World Bank. (2015 October 19). Malawi Economic Monitor 100316: Adjusting in Turbulent  
Times. Retrieved from 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/10/25169507/malawi-economic-
monitor-adjusting-turbulent-times 
World Bank. (2016). Country Overview, Malawi. Retrieved on 21 June 2016 from 
  http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malawi/overview 
 
  
104 
 
Appendix 
Table A1. Predicted Values 
  aMI bERS cFI aMI+bERS+cFI aMI+bERS aMI+cFI bERS+cFI 
1983 0,3595958 0,4099603 0,2638429 1,03339893 0,769556021 0,623438679 0,673803159 
1984 0,447288 0,3877499 0,2703215 1,10535935 0,835037893 0,717609494 0,658071311 
1985 0,447288 0,4241392 0,2980617 1,169488944 0,87142723 0,745349752 0,722200906 
1986 0,4104871 0,3657396 0,3141715 1,090398265 0,776226759 0,724658622 0,679911149 
1987 0,3227948 0,3578768 0,3243955 1,005067139 0,680671677 0,647190311 0,68227229 
1988 0,3227948 0,3531692 0,2966262 0,97259024 0,675964009 0,61942108 0,649795391 
1989 0,2842802 0,3995015 0,265345 0,949126632 0,683781673 0,549625127 0,664846466 
1990 0,2842802 0,413105 0,2098461 0,907231309 0,697385194 0,494126282 0,622951142 
1991 0,3979759 0,348237 0,1830852 0,929298159 0,746212934 0,581061153 0,531322231 
1992 0,5078504 0,3886884 0,1391855 1,035724239 0,896538731 0,647035858 0,527873888 
1993 0,4030323 0,3118369 0,1508724 0,865741635 0,714869237 0,553904723 0,462709311 
1994 0,2265884 0,4681258 0,1644062 0,859120452 0,694714204 0,390994611 0,63253209 
1995 0,2579379 0,5168411 0,1955902 0,970369173 0,774778964 0,45352809 0,712431291 
1996 0,3078338 0,5820486 0,1980213 1,087903733 0,889882464 0,505855108 0,780069893 
1997 0,3698758 0,4066712 0,2502262 1,026773215 0,776547065 0,620101998 0,656897367 
1998 0,2289595 0,3823507 0,3309599 0,94227011 0,611310214 0,559919363 0,713310644 
1999 0,2716688 0,3673887 0,3866667 1,025724254 0,639057536 0,658335508 0,754055462 
2000 0,2541045 0,4115389 0,387547 1,053190319 0,665643354 0,641651469 0,799085816 
2001 0,434698 0,3641328 0,2721136 1,070944371 0,798830819 0,706811572 0,636246352 
2002 0,4371119 0,3848742 0,1798676 1,001853772 0,821986153 0,616979555 0,564741837 
2003 0,4057448 0,547357 0,0687933 1,021895091 0,953101832 0,474538047 0,616150302 
2004 0,232519 0,5735312 0,0517974 0,857847584 0,806050207 0,284316359 0,625328601 
2005 0,3272275 0,6363595 0,0264217 0,990008699 0,963586957 0,353649236 0,662781205 
2006 0,4808677 0,6247013 0,0123941 1,117963139 1,105569029 0,493261811 0,637095437 
2007 0,4669006 0,7384455 0,0028045 1,208150626 1,205346108 0,469705134 0,741250011 
2008 0,3059784 0,7967376 0,0068647 1,109580646 1,102715988 0,312843036 0,803602269 
2009 0,1131626 0,7539608 0,0208772 0,888000606 0,867123413 0,134039813 0,774837985 
2010 0,2532236 0,6140543 0,0300597 0,897337557 0,867277845 0,283283275 0,644113994 
2011 0,4270152 0,4295048 0,0456165 0,902136536 0,856520037 0,472631744 0,475121292 
2012 0,4724663 0,290731 0,09996 0,863157298 0,763197281 0,572426269 0,390691046 
2013 0,4417636 0,2403907 0,1632923 0,845446543 0,682154272 0,605055842 0,403682971 
2014 0,4039313 0,2765122 0,2134813 0,893924692 0,680443425 0,617412526 0,489993433 
Average 0,3533515 0,4551957 0,1819848 0,990531977 0,808547141 0,535336295 0,637180517 
 
 
 
 
